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We enter with some trepidation the torturedmeanderings offederal tax
lien law, intersected now by the somewhat smoother byway of the Uniform
Commercial Code.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judge Goldberg's observation still rings true today: one does not wander
through the tax lien provisions of the Internal Revenue Code without some
anxiety and uneasiness. 2 Moreover, the degree of dread and apprehension
may induce mind-numbing trauma and uncontrollable tremors if one's
journey into the Internal Revenue Code also requires a side trip through
another statutory labyrinth, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C."). But such a pilgrimage must be undertaken when a priority
dispute erupts between the IRS and a secured creditor, with each party
claiming 3a superior property interest in the limited assets of a delinquent
taxpayer.
In an article published in 1996, Iused a series of hypotheticals to analyze
priority disputes between the IRS and the Article 9 secured creditor.4 Since
that time, the rewriting of U.C.C. Article 9 has been comyleted, and the
revised version has been enacted into law in every state. Many of the
revisions have a result-changing impact on the resolution of priority
disputes between the IRS and the Article 9 secured creditor.

1.
Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir. 1972).
2.
Other robed visitors to the Internal Revenue Code have echoed Judge Goldberg's
sentiments. See, e.g., Plymouth Savings Bank v. I.R.S., 187 F.3d 203, 206 (1st Cir. 1999);
Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 271 (5th Cir. 1976); Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Compagnoni, 162 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (S.D. Tex. 2001); In re Estate of Harless v. United
States, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (S.D. Ala. 2000); Miller v. Conte, 72 F. Supp. 2d 952, 956
(N.D. Ind. 1999); Adco Serv., Inc. v. Graphic Color Plate, 347 A.2d 549, 551 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1975).
3.
One textbook notes that "[a]t any given time, delinquent taxes total some $30 billion
owed by about 4.5 million taxpayers." LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED
CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 760 (2d ed. 1998).
4.
See Timothy R. Zinnecker, When Worlds Collide: Resolving Priority Disputes
Between the IRS and the Article Nine Secured Creditor,63 TENN. L. REV. 585 (1996).
5.
See U.C.C. § 9-701 (2001). The uniform version of revised Article 9 has an effective
date of July 1, 2001. Id. Every state adopted this date as its effective date except Connecticut
(October 1, 2001) and Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi (January 1, 2002). See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE ("State U.C.C. Variations" Volume) xxv-xxvi (2001).
Throughout this article I refer to provisions of (i) the Internal Revenue Code, codified at
Title 26 of the U.S. Code, as "I.R.C. § xxxx", (ii) revised U.C.C. Article 9 as "revised § 9-xxx",
(iii) former, or pre-revised, U.C.C. Article 9 as "former § 9-xxx", and (iv) U.C.C. provisions
outside of Article 9 as "U.C.C. § x-xxx."
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Part II of this article describes how a federal tax lien is created in favor
of the IRS. Part III examines the applicable priority rules codified in the
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") and Article 9. Part IV uses a series of
hypotheticals to analyze priority disputes between the IRS and the Article 9
secured party, focusing attention on changes under revised Article 9 that
trigger a result different from the outcome under former Article 9. The
article concludes that the changes wrought by revised Article 9 tend to favor
the secured party more than the IRS in a priority dispute.
II.

6
THE FEDERAL TAx LIEN

A tax lien is not created in favor of the IRS until the tax is assessed and
the taxpayer fails or refuses to make payment following demand.7 If a
taxpayer acknowledges the tax liability on a return, assessment occurs when
liability is noted on a list in the office of the IRS district director.8
Otherwise, assessment does not occur until (i) a tax audit reveals the
deficiency, (ii) the IRS notifies the taxpayer of the deficiency, and (iii) the
taxpayer admits liability or exhausts its "opportunities for administrative
review." 9
After assessment, the IRS must promptly send to the taxpayer a
deficiency notice. 10 If the taxpayer then fails to pay the deficiency, a lienin an amount equal to the unpaid tax plus any additional taxes and related
interest charges, penalties, and costs' '-becomes enforceable against the
taxpayer, 2 with an effective date that relates back to the date of

6.
The discussion of federal tax liens in Part II borrows heavily from my previous article.
See Zinnecker, supra note 4, at 588-90.
7.
I.R.C. § 6321 (2000) ("If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount... shall be a lien ....
");I.R.C. § 6322 (2000) ("[T]he lien
imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made ....
").
"By far the most common source of federal tax liens is payroll taxes, in the form of federal
withholding taxes and social security contributions owed by employers to the U.S.
government." LoPucK] & WARREN, supra note 3, at 760. See also JOHN 0. HONNOLD ET AL.,
SECURITY INTERESTS INPERSONAL PROPERTY 534 (3d ed. 2001) ("Examples of this misconduct

include... failing to remit sums withheld from workers for income and social security taxes.").
8. See I.R.C. § 6203 (2000); 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6201-1, 301.6203-1 (2001).
9.
DAVID G. EPSTEIN & STEVE H. NICKLES, DEBT: BANKRUPTCY, ARTICLE 9 AND
RELATED LAWS 518 (1994).
10. I.R.C. § 6303 (2000).
11. I.R.C. § 6321.
12. See I.R.C. § 633 1(a) (2000) (authorizing the IRS to levy on the taxpayer's property if
the taxpayer "neglects or refuses to pay [its tax liability] within 10 days after notice and
demand").
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assessment.1 3 The lien encumbers all of the taxpayer's real and personal
property,14 including property acquired by the taxpayer after assessment.15
The tax lien becomes enforceable against the taxpayer without the
necessity of any filing, so its existence may come as a surprise, not only to
the taxpayer but also to its creditors. In response to this so-called "secret
lien," Congress added a provision to the tax laws in 1928 that protected
certain parties from the adverse effects of the tax lien if the IRS had not
filed a notice of its tax lien.' 6 That provision was the forerunner to I.R.C. §
6323(a), which states: "[t]he lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be
valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's
lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof.., has been filed by
17
the Secretary."'

If the lien encumbers real estate, the IRS must file its notice in the office
designated by the laws of the state where the property is located. 18 If the
lien encumbers personal property, the IRS must file its notice in the office
designated by the laws of the state of the taxpayer's residence. 19 If a state
has not designated a recording office for tax lien filings, then the IRS must
file its notice with the federal district court for the judicial district in which
the encumbered property is located.20 If the encumbered property is located

13. I.R.C. § 6322 (2000) (stating the lien "shall arise at the time the assessment is made").
14. I.R.C. § 6321. State law dictates whether property "belongs" to the taxpayer and is
thus subject to the tax lien. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960); United
States v. Davenport, 106 F.3d 1333, 1335 (7th Cir. 1997). But federal law provides a taxpayer
with a list of applicable exemptions. The exemptions are codified at I.R.C. § 6334 (2000).
15. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6321-1 (2001) ("The lien attaches to all property and rights to
property belonging to such person at any time during the period of the lien, including any
property or rights to property acquiredby such person after the lien arises.") (emphasis added).
See also United States v. McDermott, 507 U.S. 447, 448 (1993); Plymouth Sav. Bank v. I.R.S.,
187 F.3d 203, 206 (1st Cir. 1999).
16.

DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL

PROPERTY 629 (2d ed. 1987). See also Lance Staricha, Giving and Taking Notice: The Relative
Priority and Enforceability of the Federal General Tax Lien Versus the State's Specific Real
Property Tax Lien, 21 HAMLNE L. REV. 469, 481 (1998) ("Because the federal general tax lien
arises immediately upon the neglect or refusal by a federal taxpayer to pay an overdue liability,
it has been referred to as the federal government's secret lien.").
17. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000). The IRS annually files approximately 1.5 million tax lien
notices. LoPucKi & WARREN, supra note 3, at 761.
18. I.R.C. § 6323(f)(1)(A)(i), (2)(A) (2000). This article does not analyze priority disputes
in real property because Article 9 excludes from its scope the debtor's transfer of an interest in
real property (other than fixtures). See U.C.C. § 9-1040) (1995) (amended 2001); U.C.C. §
9-109(d)(11) (2001).
19. I.R.C. § 6323(f)(l)(A)(ii), (2)(B) (2000).
20. I.R.C. § 6323(f)(1)(B) (2000).
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in Washington, D.C., then the IRS. must file its notice with the Recorder of
Deeds for the District of Columbia.2 '
The notice is effective for a period- of ten years and thirty days (which
commences on the assessment date, not the filing date).22 The IRS may
extend the effectiveness by refiling the notice during the last year of that
period.23
III. THE PRIORITY RULES OF THE I.Rk.C. AND U.C.C. ARTICLE

9

The general rule for resolving priority disputes between a U.C.C. Article
9 secured party and the IRS is found in I.R.C. § 6323(a), which states:
"[t]he lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any...
meets the
holder of a security interest . . . until notice thereof which
24
Secretary."
the
by
filed
been
has
(f)
subsection
of
requirements
If the statute is read literally, the IRS enjoys priority over a secured
creditor as soon as the IRS files its tax lien notice (at which time the tax lien
becomes "valid"). But that is an incorrect interpretation.
[O]ne must read into [I.R.C. § 6323(a)] something it does not say:
Tax liens and third party interests rank in the order in which they
become "valid" within the meaning of the Federal Tax Lien Act.
The idea of "frst in time, first in right" is so basic that the drafters
25
of I.R.C. § 6323 did not even consider it necessary to mention.
For a secured party to have any hope of winning a priority battle with the
IRS, the secured party must hold a "security interest" as defined by the
I.R.C.
The term "security interest" means any interest in property
acquired by contract for the purpose of securing payment or
performance of any obligation or indemnifying against loss or
21. I.R.C. § 6323(f)(1)(C) (2000).
22. I.R.C. § 6323(g)(1), (3) (2000).
23. I.R.C. § 6323(g)(3)(A) (2000).
24. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000). One court has described I.R.C. § 6323(a) as a "blueprint" for
a secured creditor that seeks priority over the competing lien of the IRS. Valley Bank of Nev. v.
City of Henderson, 528 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Nev. 1981).
25. LOPucK] & WARREN, supra note 3, at 769. See also HONNOLD ET AL., supra note 7, at
269 (Teacher's Manual) ("Although the phrase, 'not valid ...until notice ...has been filed,' is

infelicitous, to say the least, it is not read to subordinate retroactively security interests that
existed prior to the filing of a notice."); James M. Wallace, Jr., Commercial Transactions,
Annual Survey of Texas Law Part1, 45 Sw. L. J. 1419, 1457 n.285 (1992) ("This language [of
I.R.C. § 6323(a)] has been interpreted to mean that a tax lien primes security interests (and the
other enumerated interests) coming into existence after, but not before, the time that notice of
the tax lien has been properly filed.") (emphasis added).
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liability. A security interest exists at any time (A) if, at such time,
the property is in existence and the interest has become protected
under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of
an unsecured obligation, and (B) to the extent that,26at such time,
the holder has parted with money or money's worth.

The definition requires the secured creditor to satisfy five elements (two in
the first sentence, and three in the second sentence).
Under the first sentence of the definition, a secured creditor's property
interest in the taxpayer's collateral must (i) arise contractually and (ii)
secure payment or performance of an obligation or indemnify a party
27
against loss or liability. A creditor with an enforceable property interest
under Article 9 will satisfy the I.R.C.'s contractual requirement because the
28
debtor must agree to the creation and transfer of that property interest.
And under Article 9, a secured creditor's
property interest "secures payment
29
obligation."
an
of
or performance
Under the second sentence, (i) the collateral must exist at a particular
time; (ii) at that time the secured party must have parted with money or
money's worth; and (iii) at that time the secured party's property interest
must be protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien
arising out of an unsecured obligation. When read together with I.R.C. §
6321(a), the second sentence requires the secured creditor to satisfy
these
30
notice.
lien
tax
its
files
IRS
the
when
moment
the
at
three elements
26.

I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (2000).

27. The U.C.C. also defines "security interest." U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2001). But the
federal definition controls under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. ART. VI, § 2. To avoid confusion, this article refers to a creditor's Article 9
security interest as a "property interest."
28. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3) (2001) (stating that a secured party does not have an
enforceable property interest in collateral until (i) "the debtor has authenticated a security
agreement" that describes the collateral and, where appropriate, any land concerned, (ii) the
secured party possesses collateral (other than a certificated security) "pursuant to the debtor's
security agreement," (iii) the secured party has taken delivery of a certificated security
"pursuant to the debtor's security agreement," or (iv) the secured party has control of "deposit
accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights... pursuant to
the debtor's security agreement"); U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (1995) (amended 2001) (stating that a
secured party does not have an enforceable property interest in collateral until (i) the secured
party possesses the collateral "pursuant to agreement," (ii) the secured party controls investment
property "pursuant to agreement," or (iii) the debtor signs a "security agreement" that describes
the collateral and, where appropriate, any land concerned). Both former and revised Article 9
define a "security agreement" as an agreement that "creates or provides for a security interest."
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-105(1)() (1995) (amended 2001). See also U.C.C. §
1-201(b)(3) (2001) (defining "agreement"); U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12) (2001) (defining "contract").
29. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2001).

30. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-1(a)(1) (2001) (stating that "a security interest must be in
existence... before a notice of lien is filed" in order to enjoy priority under I.R.C. § 6323(a));
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The secured party can prove that "property is in existence" because its
Article 9 property interest does not arise until "the debtor has rights in the
collateral.",3 1 Also, the creditor often can satisfy the "money or money's
worth" requirement because its Article 9 property interest does not exist
until the creditor has given "value." 32 But how does the secured party prove
Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc. v. Nationwide Power Corp., 106 F.3d 366, 368 (11th Cir.
1997) ("Therefore, for Highlander's interest to take priority over the tax lien, Highlander must
have been the holder of a 'security interest,' as that term is defined in the [Federal Tax Lien Act
of 1966, 26 U.S.C. § 6323], on July 3, 1986 [the date on which the IRS filed its tax lien
notice].").
This timing requirement prevents a secured party from enjoying any priority with respect to
collateral acquired by the taxpayer, or advances funded by the secured party, after the IRS files
its tax lien notice. The secured party does receive limited protection for post-notice collateral
and post-notice advances under I.R.C. § 6323(c) and (d). This post-notice protection is
analyzed in Zinnecker, supra note 4, at 620-64. Other than provisions of revised Article 9
discussed infra in Part IV of this article that affect analysis of the "protected under local law
against a subsequent judgment lien" requirement of I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (the definition of
"security interest"), revised Article 9 does not affect the resolution of priority disputes involving
post-notice collateral and post-notice advances.
Because I.R.C. § 6323(c)(1) extends protection to post-notice "accounts receivable" but not
general intangibles, and as revised Article 9 redefines "account" in § 9-102(a)(2) in a manner
that now includes many rights to payment that were "general intangibles" as defined in former §
9-106, one might conclude that revised Article 9 improves the secured party's priority position
against the IRS if both creditors claim an interest in the taxpayer's post-notice accounts
receivable. Alas, that is not the case because the Article 9 definition of "accounts" is irrelevant.
The scope of the secured creditor's post-notice protection is constrained by the narrow
definition of "accounts receivable" found at 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(c)-i(c)(2)(ii) (2001) ("An
account receivable is any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered
which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper.").
31. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2) (2001); U.C.C.§ 9-203(l)(c) (1995) (amended 2001). "Under
[U.C.C. § 9-204], there can be no UCC security interest in property if the debtor at the time of
its purported creation has no rights therein. It would seem that subsection 6323(h)(1) is trying
to say the same thing in the words 'property is in existence."' Peter F. Coogan, The Effect of the
FederalTax Lien Act of 1966 Upon Security Interests Created Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1383 (1968).
32. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001). I say
"often can satisfy" rather than "always can satisfy" because "value" under U.C.C. § 1-204
(2001) means more than just "money or money's worth." But a creditor that sells an item or
provides a service to the taxpayer on credit, or a lender that advances funds to the taxpayer, has
given "value" under the U.C.C. and parted with "money or money's worth" under the I.R.C.
For purposes of [I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)], the term "money or money's worth"
includes money, a security (as defined in paragraph (d) of this section),
tangible or intangible property, services, and other consideration reducible to
a money value. Money or money's worth also includes any consideration
which otherwise would constitute money or money's worth under the
preceding sentence which was parted with before the security interest would
otherwise exist if, under local law, past consideration is sufficient to support
an agreement giving rise to a security interest. A relinquishing or promised
relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory estate created in lieu of
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that its property interest is "protected under local law" against a judgment
lien?
For the secured party, the applicable "local law" is the U.C.C., 33
particularly any provision of Article 9 that resolves a priority dispute
between the secured party and the holder of a judgment lien. Former
Article 9 codified such a priority rule at § 9-301(1)(b). 34 Under that rule, a
"lien creditor '35 enjoyed priority if its property interest arose before the
secured creditor perfected its property interest. Rephrased, the secured
creditor enjoyed priority if its property interest was perfected no later than
the moment when the lien creditor acquired its competing property interest
in the debtor's assets.36 To be perfected under former Article 9, a secured
dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights is not a consideration in money or
money's worth. Nor is love and affection, promise of marriage, or any other
consideration not reducible to a money value a consideration in money or
money's worth. '
26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-l(a)(3) (2001).
33. See Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 257 n.22 (1978) ("The local law applicable
is ... the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) .... ."); Citizens State Bank & Trust Co. v. Motor

Serv. Co., 902 F. Supp. 1435, 1436 n.2 (D. Kan. 1995) (same); In re Dorrough, Parks & Co.,
173 B.R. 135, 138 n.5 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994) ("The applicable local law is Tennessee's
version of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code."); Olivia F. Gallo, Conflict Between the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal Tax Lien Act, 7 WHITTIER L. REv. 1009, 1028
(1985) ("protected under the local law, i.e., perfected pursuant to the Uniform Commercial
Code....").
34. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
35. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (2000) refers to a "judgment lien," but former § 9-301(1)(b) refers
to a "lien creditor" (defined at former § 9-301(3) as "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the
property involved by attachment, levy or the like"). The difference in terminology is irrelevant.
See In re Haas, 31 F.3d 1081, 1087 (11th Cir. 1994) ("In interpreting the phrase 'protected
under local law against a subsequent judgment lien,' courts and commentators have determined
the phrase is equivalent to being protected against a 'lien creditor' as defined in U.C.C. §
9-301(3)."); First Nat'l Bank of Valdosta v. Elgin, 570 F. Supp. 849, 852 (N.D. Fla. 1983)
(citing cases); Coogan, supra note 31, at 1382-83 ("Although the two phrases are not the same,
we can assume that, for purposes of subsection (a), subsection 6323(h)(1)'s 'protected against'
the holder of a 'subsequent judgment lien' means substantially the same as 'protected against'
section 9-301(3)'s 'lien creditor."').
36. This general priority rule was subject to an exception that applied if (i) the lien
creditor's property interest arose after the secured party's property interest attached and before it
became perfected; (ii) the secured party's property interest was a purchase money security
interest (defined at U.C.C. § 9-107 (1995) (amended 2001)); and (iii) the secured party
perfected its property interest by filing a financing statement no later than ten days after the
debtor took possession of the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1995) (amended 2001)
("Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) .... "); U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1995) (amended
2001) (discussed infra at Part IV.A.3.b.).
The typical purchase money security interest (often referred to as a PMSI) arises when (i) a
seller retains a property interest in goods sold on credit to secure repayment of the unpaid
purchase price or (ii) a lender retains a property interest in goods purchased by a buyer with the
lender's money.
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party had to prove that its property interest had become enforceable against
the debtor (i.e., "attached") and the creditor had taken any other applicable
step required by Article 9 (e.g., filing a financing statement).37 So for its
property interest to be protected "under local law against a subsequent
judgment lien" (and therefore be a "security interest" as defined by the
I.R.C.) under former Article 9, the secured party had to prove that its
property interest was perfected no later than when the IRS filed its tax lien
notice.
Revised Article 9 has amended the rule governing priority disputes
between a secured party and a lien creditor. 38 Under revised § 9-317(a)(2),
a secured creditor continues to enjoy priority over the competing claim of a
lien creditor if the secured creditor's property interest is perfected when the
lien creditor's property interest arises.3 9 This rule is no different than the
predecessor rule in former Article 9. But, under an alternative test, revised
Article 9 also awards priority to a secured creditor that has satisfied two
requirements no later than when the lien creditor's property interest arose.
First, the secured party must have filed a financing statement against the
collateral.4 ° Second, the secured party must have satisfied one of the four
conditions of revised § 9-203(b)(3): 4 (1) "the debtor has authenticated a
security agreement" that describes the collateral and, if applicable, the land
concerned; 42 (2) the secured party possesses collateral other than a
certificated security; 43 (3) "the collateral is a certificated security in
registered form," that "has been delivered to the secured party; ' ' 4 or (4) the
secured party has control of the collateral consisting of "deposit accounts,
45
electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights.,
This revision effectively awards priority to a secured party who is

37. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1995) (amended 2001). Filing a financing statement is the
most common, but not the exclusive, method of perfecting a security interest. Subject to
relevant statutory requirements, a creditor can perfect its security interest by taking possession
of collateral, taking control of collateral, or complying with a federal or state registration
scheme. In a few instances (most notably purchase money security interests in consumer
goods), a security interest becomes automatically perfected at the moment of attachment. See
generally statutes cited in U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1995) (amended 2001).
38. Revised Article 9 makes no change to the definition of "lien creditor," now found at
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(52) (2001).
39. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001).
40. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(B) (2001).
41. Id.
42. U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A) (2001).
43. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(B).
44. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(C).
45. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(D).
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unperfected when the lien• creditor's property
interest arises solely because
46
the secured party has not yet given value.
Does the revised priority rule aid a secured party in a priority dispute
with the IRS? Not at all. Notwithstanding the secured party's ability to
prove that its property interest is protected under local law against the
competing property claim of a lien creditor, the secured party still must
satisfy all of the other elements of the I.R.C.'s definition of "security
interest." One of those elements requires the secured party to part with
"money or money's worth. ' ' 7 A secured party that has yet to give "value"
under the U.C.C. has not yet parted with "money or money's worth."
Therefore, the secured creditor does not yet have a "security interest" under
the I.R.C. and would not enjoy priority in a property dispute with the IRS
(even though the secured party might enjoy priority under revised § 9317(a)(2) against any other lien creditor).
Because the revised priority rule of revised § 9-317(a)(2)(B) fails to aid a
secured party that is involved in a priority dispute with the IRS, the secured
party's degree of protection under local law against a lien creditor is
identical under both former and revised Article 9: to enjoy priority, the
secured creditor's property interest must be perfected no later than when the
lien creditor's property interest arises. 4s
Under both former and revised Article 9, the secured creditor will not
enjoy priority over the competing claim of the IRS unless the secured
creditor has perfected its property interest no later than the moment when
the IRS files its tax lien notice. As revised Article 9 has not changed the
priority rule, one might conclude that the resolution of every priority
dispute between the IRS and the secured party should render an identical
result under both former and revised Article 9. But as Part IV reveals, that
conclusion is erroneous.

46. See U.C.C. § 9-317 cmt. 4 (2001) (explaining purpose for changing priority rule); see
also U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1) (2001) (stating elements of enforceability, including "value has been

given"); U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (2001) (requiring attachment as a predicate to perfection); U.C.C. §
9-203(a) (2001) (indicating "[a] security interest attaches... when it becomes enforceable").

47.

I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (2000).

48. See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
As noted earlier, former Article 9 provided an exception applicable to purchase money security
interests. See supra note 36. Revised Article 9 has a similar, although not identical, exception.
See U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (2001). This exception under both former and revised Article 9 is
discussed infra at Part IV.A.3.b.
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IV.

CHANGING THE RULES, REVERSING THE RESULTS

The priority rule that resolves a dispute between the Article 9 secured
party and the IRS is identical under both former Article 9 and revised
Article 9. If the secured party is perfected when the IRS files its tax lien
notice, the secured party has priority. If the secured party is not yet
perfected when the IRS files its tax lien notice, the tax lien is superior.4 9
One cannot apply the priority rule without knowing the perfection rules.
Although the priority rules of revised § 9-317(a)(2) and former § 9301(1)(b) are uniform (at least when the IRS is the opposing creditor), the
perfection rules are not. Moreover, many of the changes reverse the priority
enjoyed by the secured party or the IRS under former Article 9.
Most of the result-altering changes have been made to the filing rules of
Article 9 and are analyzed in Part A. A few of the changes that reverse
priority have been made to the non-filing rules of Article 9 and are analyzed
in Part B. The analytical format is consistent throughout Parts A and B. A
specific perfection rule of former Article 9 is introduced, followed by a
discussion of any problems that the secured party encountered under the
rule. Then the relevant perfection rule of revised Article 9 is stated, with an
explanation of how the successor rule addresses the problems raised by its
predecessor. The former and revised rules are then applied to resolve a
hypothetical dispute between the IRS and the secured creditor, the outcome
of which illustrates that the change in rules also has changed the priority.
A.

Changes to the FilingRules

Four changes that affect the contents of a financing statement are
analyzed in Section 1. Two changes that concern the filing location are
examined in Section 2. Three other filing-related changes are reviewed in
Section 3.
1.

Content-based filing revisions

a. Debtor's name
A financing statement must provide the name of the debtor.50 Because
5
the filing clerk records the financing statement by the debtor's name, '

49.
50.
51.

See generally, supra Part III.
U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(1) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1995) (amended 2001).
U.C.C. § 9-519(c)(1) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-403(4) (1995) (amended 2001).
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accuracy in stating the debtor's name is paramount. Otherwise,
the filing
52
may not accomplish its goal of providing notice to searchers.
Occasionally a secured party erroneously records the debtor's name
when preparing the financing statement. For example, the debtor's name
may be reflected on the filing as "Bois Clair Corporation" instead of the
legal name of "Boisclair Corporation,, 53 or "Voyager Trading Co." instead
of the legal name of"Voyageur Trading Co." 54 Also, the secured party may
accurately reflect the debtor's name on the financing statement, but during
the term of the loan the debtor may change its legal name (e.g., from
"Sharbill, Inc." to "Falk Interiors, Inc.," 5 or from "Bass Plumbing, Heating
and Cooling, Inc." to "Bass Mechanical Contractors, Inc." 56). What effect
does an initial mistake or a subsequent name change have on the
effectiveness of the financing statement (and the secured party's
perfection)?
Under former Article 9, an initial financing statement that erroneously
stated the debtor's name was ineffective to perfect a security interest if the
error was "seriously misleading." 57 If a debtor subsequently changed its
name in such a manner that the initial financing statement became
"seriously misleading," the financing statement was ineffective "to perfect a
security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months
after the [name] change." 58 But former Article 9 made no attempt to define
"seriously misleading," leaving the task to judicial resolution. Not
surprisingly, the courts failed to adopt a uniform
standard, resulting in
59
inconsistent (and perhaps even irrational) holdings.
Revised Article 9 also adopts a "seriously misleading" test against which
errors and name changes are measured.60 But unlike its predecessor,
revised Article 9 provides a standard against which the nature of an error or
name change can be measured:
52. See ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Unlimited Auto. Inc., 166 B.R. 637, 641 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that "[t]he purpose behind the filing provisions is to provide notice to
subsequent creditors"); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's
Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595, 617 n.114 (1998) ("The purpose of the filing requirement is

to provide notice to the public and to the debtor's other creditors of the status of the transferred
assets taken as collateral or sold.").
53. Chem. Bank v. Title Serv., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1989).
54. Corporate Financers, Inc. v. Voyageur Trading Co., 519 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. Ct. App.
1994).
55. In re Falk Interiors, Inc., 61 B.R. 720 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986).
56. In re Bass Mech. Contractors, Inc., 84 B.R. 1009 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).
57. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1995) (amended 2001).
58. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1995) (amended 2001).
59. See Zinnecker, supra note 4, at 594-95 n.42, 598-99 n.62 (summarizing cases).

60.

U.C.C. § 9-506(a)-(b) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-507(c) (2001).
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If a search of the records of the filing office under the debtor's

correct name, using the filing office's standard search logic, if any,
would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently to
provide the name of the debtor in accordance with Section 9503(a), the name provided does not make the financing statement
seriously misleading. 6'
In other words, a financing statement is seriously misleading if a search
against the debtor's correct name fails to disclose the filing.
The following example illustrates how this change in law may adversely
affect a secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #1
On March 1, Bank loaned $100,000 to Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc. The
loan was secured by an enforceable security interest in Thriftway's present
and future inventory and accounts. That same day, Bank filed with the
appropriate clerk a financing statement, naming the debtor as "Thriftway
Auto Stores." The IRS filed a tax lien notice against Thriftway on
October 1.
In a dispute between Bank and the IRS concerning Thriftway's inventory
and accounts as of October 1, whose interest enjoys priority if a search
against "Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc." does not reveal the filing against
"Thriftway Auto Stores"?
Under the I.R.C., Bank has priority if it holds a "security interest" in the
collateral when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 62 In order to hold a
"security interest" under the I.R.C., Bank's interest must enjoy priority
under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor as of October 1.63
Under former Article 9, whether Bank's property interest in the collateral
is perfected turns on whether the erroneous statement of the debtor's name
on the filing has rendered the filing "seriously misleading."'64 In the case in
which a secured party made the identical error, the court held that the error
was not "seriously misleading" (even though a search against the debtor's
legal name failed to reveal the filing) and, as a result, the secured party was

61. U.C.C. § 9-506(c) (2001). Revised § 9-503(a) provides rules for determining the
"debtor's correct name." The rules vary with the nature of the debtor (e.g., a "registered
organization" as defined in revised § 9-102(a)(70), a decedent's estate, a trust or trustee, and all
others-including partnerships and individuals).

62.
63.

I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).

64.

U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1995) (amended 2001).

HeinOnline -- 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 933 2002

934

ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

perfected.65 Armed with this precedent, a court could hold that Bank is
perfected and its property interest is protected against the competing claim
of a lien creditor as of October 1.66 Therefore, Bank would enjoy priority
under former Article 9 because Bank had a "security interest" under the
I.R.C. on the filing date of the tax lien notice.67
Under revised Article 9, Bank's perfected status also turns on whether its
financing statement is "seriously misleading." 68 Bank's financing statement
is "seriously misleading" because a search against the debtor's legal name
failed to reveal the filing.6 9 Because Bank's security interest is unperfected,
its property interest is subordinate to the competing property interest of a
lien creditor.70 Therefore, the federal tax lien is superior under revised
Article 9 because Bank did not hold a "security interest" under the I.R.C. as
of October 1.71
b.

Addresses ofparties

Former Article 9 required a financing statement to provide "a mailing
address of the debtor" and "an address of the secured party from which
information concerning the security interest may be obtained., 72 A filing
that lacked either piece of information might be rejected (hopefully
prompting the secured party to refile a corrected financing statement). The
clerk also might record the defective filing. Even so, some courts held that
omission of either party's address rendered the filing ineffective, leaving
the
73
secured party unperfected (absent perfection by some other means).

65. See In re Thriftway Auto Supply, Inc., 159 B.R. 948, 953-54 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1993) (noting the difference between the two names was "slight," and holding that the creditor's
search against only the legal name "was not reasonably diligent" when a slightly broader
search-e.g., against "Thriftway"--would have revealed the earlier filing).
66. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
67. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
68. U.C.C. § 9-506(a) (2001).
69. U.C.C. § 9-506(c) (2001); see also G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised
Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 36 (2001) (suggesting that the new
standard "will make it easier ... to attack financing statements with errors in the debtor's
name").

70. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001).
71. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
72. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1995) (amended 2001).
73. See, e.g., In re Permian Anchor Servs., Inc., 649 F.2d 763, 766 (10th Cir. 1981)
(concluding absence of debtor's address was fatal error); In re Keefer, 26 B.R. 597, 598 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1983) (concluding absence of debtor's address was fatal error); In re L & K Transp.
Co., 8 B.R. 921, 923 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (concluding absence of debtor's address was fatal
error); Strevell-Paterson Fin. Co. v. May, 422 P.2d 366, 369-70 (N.M. 1967) (concluding
omission of secured party's address was fatal). Some courts refused to adopt a per se rule,
instead preferring to review the particular facts of the case to determine whether the defect
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Under revised Article 9, a filing officer "shall refuse to accept" a
financing statement that omits either party's address.74 Notwithstanding the
non-discretionary nature of the duty to reject, the filing clerk may, however,
record the financing statement. If recorded, the financing statement is
effective,75 even though the filing fails to provide an address for the debtor
or the secured party.
The following example illustrates that this change may aid a secured
party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #2
Bank loaned $100,000 to Dealer on March 1, taking an enforceable
security interest in Dealer's existing and future inventory. That same day,
Bank submitted a financing statement to the appropriate clerk. Although
the filing omitted Dealer's mailing address, the clerk recorded the financing
statement.
Bank also loaned $20,000 to Clinic on March 1, taking an enforceable
security interest in Clinic's existing and future equipment. That same day,
undermined the notice function of the filing. See, e.g., In re Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799, 805
(W.D. Okla. 1975) ("Clearly, the view that the omission of a debtor's address from a financing
statement does not prevent it from perfecting a security interest is the better view."); Riley v.
Miller, 549 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (concluding omission of both addresses was
not fatal in absence of evidence that omission was prejudicial).
74. U.C.C. § 9-520(a) (2001) (cross-referencing "reason[s] set forth in Section 9-516(b)");
U.C.C. § 9-516(b)(4) (2001) (describing a financing statement that "does not provide a ...
mailing address for the secured party of record"); U.C.C. § 9-516(b)(5)(a) (2001) (describing a
financing statement that fails to "provide a mailing address for the debtor").
75. See U.C.C. § 9-520(c) (2001). A secured party's interest that is perfected by the filing
may nevertheless be subordinate to the competing interest of another secured party if (i) the
filing contains erroneous information required by revised § 9-516(b)(5) and (ii) the other
secured party gave value in reasonable reliance on the erroneous information. U.C.C. §§ 9520(c), -338(1) (2001). A lien creditor is not a party protected by revised § 9-338. Subsection
(1) protects a holder of a "conflicting perfected security interest" and subsection (2) protects a
"purchaser" (a party to a "voluntary transaction creating an interest in property"). U.C.C. §§
9-338, 1-201(b)(29) (2001) (emphasis added).
76. Unlike former Article 9, revised Article 9 does not require the financing statement to
provide addresses for the debtor and the secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (2001) (requiring
the debtor's name, the name of the secured party or its representative, and a collateral
description). But the filing clerk has the statutory authority to reject such a filing (in addition to
other filings described in revised § 9-516(b)) under revised § 9-520(a) because:
[t]he information required by Section 9-516(b)(5) assists searchers in
weeding out "false positives," i.e., records that a search reveals but which do
not pertain to the debtor in question. It assists filers by helping to ensure that
the debtor's name is correct and that the financing statement is filed in the
proper jurisdiction.
U.C.C. § 9-520 cmt. 3 (2001).

HeinOnline -- 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 935 2002

ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Bank submitted a financing statement to the appropriate clerk. Although
the filing omitted Bank's mailing address, the clerk recorded the financing
statement. The IRS filed a tax lien notice against Dealer and Clinic on
October 1.
In a dispute between Bank and the IRS concerning inventory that Dealer
acquired before October 1, whose interest enjoys priority? In a dispute
between Bank and the IRS concerning equipment that Clinic acquired
before October 1, whose interest is superior?
Under the I.R.C., Bank has priority if it holds a "security interest" in
Dealer's inventory and Clinic's equipment when the IRS filed its tax lien
notice. 77 In order to hold a "security interest" under the I.R.C., Bank's
interests must enjoy priority under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor as of
October 1.78
Under former Article 9, Bank's property interests in Dealer's inventory
and Clinic's equipment might be unperfected because Bank's financing
statements omit an address of one of the parties. 79 If Bank's property
interests are unperfected, its interests in the inventory and equipment are
subordinate to the interests of a lien creditor. 8 Accordingly, the IRS would
enjoy priority in Dealer's inventory and Clinic's equipment under former
Article 9 because Bank did not have a "security interest" under the I.R.C. as
of October 1.81
Under revised Article 9, Bank's property interests in Dealer's inventory
and Clinic's equipment are perfected because a financing statement that
omits a mailing address of either party is effective upon filing.82 Because
Bank's property interests are perfected before October 1, its interests in
Dealer's inventory and Clinic's equipment enjoy priority over the
competing claims of a lien creditor. 83 Therefore, Bank's property interest in
Dealer's inventory and Clinic's equipment is superior under revised Article
9 because Bank holds a "security interest" under the I.R.C. as of
October 1.84

77.
78.

I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).

79.
80.

U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1995) (amended 2001).
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).

81.

I.R.C. § 6323(a).

82.
83.
84.

U.C.C. § 9-520(c) (2001).
U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001).
I.R.C. § 6323(a).
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Collateraldescription

Under former Article 9, a financing statement had to "reasonably
identify" the collateral by item or type. 85 To describe collateral by "type,"
creditors used one or more generic terms defined by and used in Article 9 to
describe collateral (e.g., "accounts," "equipment," and "inventory"). But
case law consistently held that a supergeneric description-such as "all of
the debtor's assets" or "all of the debtor's personal property"-was overly
broad or too vague and failed to reasonably identify the collateral by type,
rendering the86 financing statement ineffective and the secured party often
unperfected.

Like its predecessor, revised Article 9 also requires a financing statement
to "reasonably identify" the collateral.87 While revised Article 9 continues
to prohibit supergeneric collateral descriptions in a security agreement, 88 it
expressly approves 89the use of supergeneric collateral descriptions in a
financing statement.

85. U.C.C. § 9-110 (1995) (amended 2001) (indicating a collateral description is sufficient
"if it reasonably identifies what is described"); U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1995) (amended 2001)
(requiring a financing statement to contain "a statement indicating the types, or describing the
items, of collateral").
86. See, e.g., In re Boogie Enters., Inc., 866 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
"personal property" insufficient to perfect interest in settlement proceeds); Lehigh Press, Inc. v.
Nat'l Bank of Ga., 389 S.E.2d 376, 378 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (ruling "all personal property"
failed to describe debtor's accounts); cf In re Legal Data Sys., Inc., 135 B.R. 199, 201 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1991) ("One of the basic words in English is 'all.' It is actually easier to understand
'all' than a compilation of all of the U.C.C. generics. Why must a security document state
1+1+1 when 3 is easily understood?").
87. U.C.C. § 9-108(a) (2001) (indicating a collateral description is sufficient "if it
reasonably identifies what is described"); U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(3) (2001) ("[A] financing
statement is sufficient only if it . . . indicates the collateral covered by the financing
statement."). Unlike its predecessor, revised Article 9 does not require a description only by
"item" or "type." Examples of reasonable identifications are found in revised § 9-108(b). One
example permits a description by "type," subject to narrow exceptions. U.C.C. § 9-108(b)(3),
(e) (2001).
88. U.C.C. § 9-108(c) (2001) ("A description of collateral as 'all the debtor's assets' or
'all the debtor's personal property' or using words of similar import does not reasonably
identify the collateral.").
89. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (2001) ("A financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral
that it covers if the financing statement provides ... an indication that the financing statement
covers all assets or all personal property."). The Official Comments moot any argument that the
prohibition in revised § 9-108(c) against supergeneric collateral descriptions applies to
financing statements. See U.C.C. § 9-108 cmt. 2 (2001) ("[S]ubsection (c) . . . follows
prevailing case law and adopts the view that an 'all assets' or 'all personal property' description
for purposes of a security agreement is not sufficient. Note, however, that under Section 9-504,
afinancing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral if it 'covers all assets or all personal
property."').
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The following example illustrates that this change in law may aid a
secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #3
Bank loaned $100,000 to Debtor on March 1, taking an enforceable
security interest in all of Debtor's personalty. The security agreement,
which included an after-acquired property clause, described the collateral as
"accounts, chattel paper, documents, equipment, general intangibles,
instruments, inventory, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights. 9 °
That same day, Bank took possession of Debtor's instruments 9' and filed
with the appropriate clerk a financing statement against "all of Debtor's
personal property." The IRS filed a tax lien notice against Debtor on
October 1.
In a dispute between Bank and the IRS concerning the collateral
acquired by Debtor prior to October 1 and not in Bank's possession, whose
property interest is senior?
Under the I.R.C., Bank enjoys priority in the non-possessory collateral if
it holds a "security interest" when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 92 In
order to hold a "security interest" under the I.R.C., Bank's interest must
enjoy priority under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor as of October 1.93

90. Under revised Article 9, a secured party taking an interest in all of the debtor's
personalty will add two other generic types of collateral excluded from the scope of former
Article 9: deposit accounts and commercial tort claims. U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1995) (amended
2001) (excluding tort claims); U.C.C. § 9-104(o (1995) (amended 2001) (excluding deposit
accounts except as provided with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds); U.C.C. §
9-109(d)(12) (2001) (excluding tort claims "other than a commercial tort claim"); U.C.C. §
9-109(d)(13) (2001) (excluding "an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer
transaction"); see also U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(l 3) (2001) (defining "commercial tort claim"); U.C.C.
§ 9-102(a)(29) (2001) (defining "deposit account"); U.C.C. § 9-108(e) (2001) (indicating that
mere reference to a "commercial tort claim" is an inadequate description); U.C.C. § 9-204(b)(2)
(2001) (stating that a security interest in a commercial tort claim will not attach under an afteracquired property clause).
91. Under former Article 9, the only method of perfecting a security interest in
instruments was possession. See U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1995) (amended 2001). Although revised
Article 9 permits a secured party to perfect its security interest in instruments by filing, see
revised § 9-312(a), possession will enhance the secured party's priority against selected
claimants. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-330(d) (2001) (awarding priority to a purchaser of an
instrument who takes possession); U.C.C. § 9-331 (a) (2001) (awarding priority to a "holder in
due course" (who, as a "holder" under U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A) (2001), must have
possession)).
92. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
93. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
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Under former Article 9, Bank's non-possessory interest is unperfected
because Bank's financing statement failed to reasonably identify the
collateral. 94
Because Bank is unperfected, its security interest is
subordinate to the interest of a lien creditor.95 The IRS would enjoy priority
under former Article 9 because Bank did not have a "security interest"
under the I.R.C. as of October 1.96
Under revised Article 9, Bank's non-possessory interest is perfected by
the financing statement because a supergeneric collateral description is
sufficient to reasonably identify the collateral.97 Because Bank's security
interest is perfected before October 1, its interest takes priority over the
competing claim of a lien creditor.98 Therefore, Bank has a superior
property interest under revised Article 9 because Bank holds a "security
interest" under the I.R.C. as of October 1.99
d. Debtor's signature
100
Former Article 9 required a debtor to sign the financing statement.
The clerk might reject a filing that lacked the debtor's signature (hopefully
prompting the secured party to timely remedy the defect). The clerk also
might record the defective filing. But even if the defective statement was
recorded, omission of the debtor's signature rendered the filing ineffective
and the secured party unperfected (unless perfected by some other

means). 101

In an effort to better accommodate electronic commerce and facilitate
paperless filing, revised Article 9 no longer requires a debtor to sign a
financing statement.' ° 2 To be effective, the debtor must authorize the
94.
95.
96.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
I.R.C. § 6323(a).

97.
98.
99.

U.C.C. § 9-504 (2001).
U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001).
I.R.C. § 6323(a).

100. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1995) (amended 2001).
101. See, e.g., Sommers v. Int'l Bus. Machs., 640 F.2d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
absence of debtor's signature rendered financing statement defective); In re Ace Sports Mgmt.,
L.L.C., 271 B.R. 134, 155-56 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001) (holding absence of debtor's signature
rendered financing statement defective); Guardian State Bank v. Lambert, 834 P.2d 605, 607-

08 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding absence of debtor's signature rendered financing statement
defective). Courts consistently refused to excuse the signature omission under former §
9-402(8). See, e.g., In re Garrow, 50 B.R. 799, 800 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (concluding that the
signature omission is a failure of substantial compliance and seriously misleading); Southwest
Bank of Omaha v. Moritz, 277 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Neb. 1979) (holding that "the filing of a

financing statement which is not signed by the owner of the collateral .
perfect the security interest").
102. U.C.C. § 9-502(a) & cmt. 3 (2001).
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filing.10 3 But the debtor's execution or other authentication of the security
agreement constitutes authorization to file a financing statement against
collateral described in the security agreement. 104
The following example illustrates that these changes in law may aid a
secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #4
Bank loaned $20,000 to Clinic on March 1, taking an enforceable
security interest in Clinic's existing and future equipment. That same day,
Bank submitted a financing statement to the appropriate clerk. Although
Clinic did not sign the filing, the clerk recorded the financing statement.
The IRS filed a tax lien notice against Clinic on October 1.
In a dispute between Bank and the IRS concerning equipment that Clinic
acquired before October 1, whose interest enjoys priority?
Under the I.R.C., Bank has priority if it holds a "security interest" in the
equipment when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 105 In order to hold a
"security interest" under the I.R.C., Bank's interest must enjoy priority
under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor as of October 1.106
Under former Article 9, Bank's interest in Clinic's equipment is
unperfected because its financing statement is defective: it is not signed by
Clinic. 10 7 Because Bank's property interest is unperfected, its interest in the
equipment is subordinate to the interest of a lien creditor.10 8 The IRS would
enjoy priority in Clinic's equipment under former Article 9 because Bank
did not have a "security interest" under the I.R.C. as of October 1.109
Under revised Article 9, Bank's interest in Clinic's equipment is
perfected because Clinic need only authorize, rather than sign, the financing
statement, and the necessary authorization is found in Clinic's
authentication of the security agreement. 110 Because Bank's property
interest is perfected before October 1, its interest in Clinic's equipment is
superior to the competing claim of a lien creditor."1 Therefore, Bank

103. U.C.C. § 9-509(a)(1) (2001).

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

U.C.C. § 9-509(b)(1) (2001).
I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1995) (amended 2001).
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
I.R.C. § 6323(a).
U.C.C. § 9-509(a)(1), (b)(1) (2001).
U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001).

HeinOnline -- 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 940 2002

34:0003]

; AND THE WINNER IS... ?

enjoys priority in Clinic's equipment under revised Article 9 because Bank
holds a "security interest" under the I.R.C. as of October 1.112
2.
a.

Location-based filing revisions

Interstatetransactions

A debtor may have a nexus with more than one state. For example, a
corporate debtor may be chartered under Delaware law, operate plants in
Texas, Florida, and California, and have its chief executive office in New
York. A lender that intends to make a secured loan to such a debtor must
ask itself: Where should I file my financing statement(s)?
Former Article 9 adopted rules that varied with the type of collateral.
For example, a "collateral location test" applied if the collateral included
"documents, instruments, letters of credit, and ordinary goods" (e.g.,
inventory and equipment), 1 3 and a "debtor location test" applied when the
14
collateral consisted of accounts, general intangibles, and mobile goods.'
Other rules governed goods covered by a certificate of title, chattel paper,
minerals, and investment property. 115 These rules raised a host of concerns
for the secured party:
Q:
When is a good "ordinary" (and subject to a collateral
location test), rather than "mobile" (and subject to a debtor
location test)?
are covered by a
A:
Goods are ordinary unless they
16
minerals."
or
mobile,
certificate of title,

1.

When are goods mobile?
Q:
A:
Goods are mobile if they are "of a type normally used
in more than one jurisdiction, . . . are equipment or are
to others, and
inventory leased or held for lease by the' debtor
17
are not covered by a certificate of title." "

112. I.R.C. § 6323(a).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.
U.C.C.

§ 9-103(1)(a), (b) (1995) (amended 2001).
§ 9-103(3)(a), (b) (1995) (amended 2001).
§ 9-103(2), (4), (5), (6) (1995) (amended 2001) (respectively).
§ 9-103(1)(a) (1995) (amended 2001).
§ 9-103(3)(a) (1995) (amended 2001).
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Q:
Does the debtor's actual use, or an industry standard,
dictate whether goods are "of a type normally used in more
than one jurisdiction"?
An industry standard.' 18
A:
2.

Where is a debtor located for purposes of the debtor
Q:
location test?
A:
"A debtor shall be deemed located at his place of
business if he has one, at his chief executive office if he has
more than one place of business, otherwise at his
residence."119
Q:
What is a "chief executive office"?
A:
Although undefined, it does not mean the place of
incorporation (e.g., Delaware in the example above). 120 But
the statute offers some guidance. "[I]t means the place from
which in fact the debtor manages the main part of his
business operations. This is the place where persons dealing
with the debtor would normally look for credit
information....",,1
Q:
Is the "main part" of a debtor's business calculated
by revenues, profit, number of employees, or some other
information?
There is no statutory answer, "but it would be rare
A:
that there could be more than two possibilities. A secured
party in such a case may easily protect himself at22no great
additional burden by filing in each possible place."'

118. See U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 5(b) para. 3 (1995) (amended 2001); In re Dennis Mitchell
Indus., Inc., 419 F.2d 349, 358 (3d Cir. 1969); In re Organic Conversion Corp., 259 B.R. 350,
359 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2001); Cory L. Collins, How Secure Are You? The Effects ofPerfection
and Non-Perfection Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 66 Mo. L. REv. 507,
514 (2001).
119. U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(d) (1995) (amended 2001).
120. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 5(c) (1995) (amended 2001).
121. Id.

122. Id. For a sample of cases that have examined the meaning of "chief executive office,"
see In re Nemko Inc., 209 B.R. 590, 600-08 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1997), In re Astrocade, Inc., 31
B.R. 245, 248-51 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). See also Kevin White, 0' Give Me a Home:
Determining the Location of the Debtor's ChiefExecutive Office Under Section 9-103 of the
UCC, 18 REv. LrrIG. 207 (1999).
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3.

Q:
What happens to the effectiveness of a financing
statement if a debtor moves its collateral or its location (e.g.,
its chief executive office) to a jurisdiction where the creditor
has not filed a financing statement?
A:
A creditor that fails to refile in the new jurisdiction
within four months after the debtor relocates
itself or the
23
collateral becomes unperfected thereafter.

4.

Q:
If a creditor files against inventory located in State A,
will its perfection extend to accounts if the debtor's chief
executive office is located in State B, where the creditor has
not filed a financing statement?
A:
Yes, but only for ten days after the debtor generates
the accounts.
Thereafter, the automatic perfection of
identifiable proceeds terminates and, unless the creditor has
filed in State 24
B, its security interest in the accounts becomes
unperfected. 1

These issues reveal that a secured party had to avoid many pitfalls in
order to enjoy continued perfection and priority. Did the creditor request a
U.C.C. search report from every possible jurisdiction? Did it file in every
possible jurisdiction? Did it correctly identify the type of collateral? Is it
123. U.C.C. §§ 9-103(1)(d)(i), -103(3)(e) (1995) (amended 2001); In re Specialty
Contracting & Supply, Inc., 140 B.R. 922, 924 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (holding creditor's
failure to timely refile in Georgia after debtor relocated its business from Texas to Georgia
rendered security interest unperfected); see also In re Nemko, Inc., 209 B.R. at 599-608
(concluding creditor's security interest in debtor's accounts became unperfected when creditor
failed to timely refile in New York after debtor relocated its chief executive office from New
Jersey to New York); Gennet v. Fason, 178 B.R. 888, 890-92 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding creditor
took necessary steps to continue perfection of security interest in inventory relocated by debtor
from Florida to Missouri and Kentucky).
The four-month period was not absolute. If the effective period (normally five years under
former § 9-403(2)) of the financing statement lapsed during the four-month period, the secured
party had to refile in the new jurisdiction before the lapse. Alternatively, the creditor could
obtain the benefit of the full four months by timely filing a continuation statement in the same
office where the initial financing statement was recorded.
124. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1995) (amended 2001). The creditor cannot invoke the
protection afforded by subsection (a) because the filing office for inventory is State A under

former § 9-103(1) and the filing office for accounts is State B under former § 9-103(3).
Subsection (a) applied only if the filing office for proceeds was the same filing office for the
original collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a) (1995) (amended 2001) ("and the proceeds are
collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office or offices where
the financing statement has been filed ....
");U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 8 (ex. 8) (1995) (amended
2001) ("If the filings as to inventory were not effective under subsection (6) for filing as to
accounts because a filing for accounts would have to be in a different filing office under Section
9-103(3), these inventory filings would nevertheless be effective for 10 days as to accounts.").
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confident that it knows where the debtor and all of its assets are located?
How does the creditor protect itself against the risk that the debtor will
relocate itself or its assets to a new jurisdiction?
As noted by others, revised Article 9 has significantly overhauled, and
125
reduced the complexity of, the filing rules in multi-state transactions.
Unless the collateral consists of goods covered by a certificate of title,
deposit accounts, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights, a secured
party will file its financing statement where the "debtor is located."' 126 The
location of the collateral is irrelevant. The following rules dictate a debtor's
location:
1.
A "registered organization" organized under the law
of a state is located in that state. 127 The term is defined as
"an organization organized solely under the law of a single
State or the United States and as to which the State or the
United States must maintain a public record showing the
organization to have been organized." 2 8 The term includes
corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability
companies, but excludes general partnerships.129

125. Jean Wegman Bums, New Article 9 of the UCC: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,
2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 29, 39 (suggesting that "no change in new Article 9 deserves greater
applause and accolades than the change in the where-to-file rules"); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger
& Michael G. Hillinger, 2001: A Code Odyssey (New Dawnfor the Article 9 Secured Creditor),
106 COM. L. J. 105, 128 (2001) ("Revised Article 9 significantly reduces both the hazards and
risks of initial filings and the need to re-perfect postfiling."); Robert M. Lloyd, The New Article
9: Its Impact on Tennessee Law (Part I), 67 TENN. L. REv. 125, 131 (1999) ("The most
significant change in Revised Article 9 is the change in where a financing statement is filed.");
See, e.g., Warner, supra note 69, at 41 ("The revised Act greatly simplifies the filing rules.");
Elaine A. Welle, An Introduction to Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 WYo.
L. REV. 555, 570 (2001) ("Revised Article 9 radically changes the choice-of-law rules. The
most significant change is to where financing statements are filed.").
126. U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001). For rules applicable to goods covered by a certificate of
title, deposit accounts, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights, see revised § 9-303,
revised § 9-304, revised § 9-305, and revised § 9-306, respectively.
127. U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (2001).
128. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(70) (2001). For those who think that the revised filing rules will
significantly increase filing revenue in Delaware at the expense of the other forty-nine states,
think again. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of IncorporationShould Be the
Proper Placefor Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MHNN. L. REv. 577, 638-45 (1995)
(discussing what the author calls "The Delaware Issue"); cf David Ley Hamilton & Michael
Houghton, A New Article 9 Secures Those Loans, Bus. LAW TODAY, 58 (March/April 2002)
(noting that "[fliling and search volumes [in Delaware] rose 30 percent in both 1999 and 2000
[and] [v]olumes reached record growth of 200 percent in the second half of 2001") (quoting
Rick Geisenberger, Delaware's Assistant Secretary of State)).
129. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 11 (2001).
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2.
An organization that is not "registered" is located at
its place of business. 30 If it has more than one place of
business, it is located at its chief executive office.131
3.
An132individual is located at his or her principal
residence.
4.

13 3
The United States is located in Washington, D.C.

The following example illustrates how this change in law may favor a
secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #5
Debtor is a corporation chartered under Texas law. It sells furniture
through its stores located in Houston, Texas and Tulsa, Oklahoma. Its chief
executive office is located in Houston.

130. U.C.C. § 9-307(b)(2) (2001). A "'place of business' means... a place where a debtor
conducts its affairs." U.C.C. § 9-307(a) (2001).
131. U.C.C. § 9-307(b)(3) (2001). As under former Article 9, revised Article 9 does not
define "chief executive office" but does offer guidance. The term "means the place from which
the debtor manages the main part of its business operations or other affairs. This is the place
where persons dealing with the debtor would normally look for credit information ....
U.C.C.
§ 9-307 cmt. 2, para. 4 (2001). If doubt exists, a secured party should file in every possible

jurisdiction. Id.
132. U.C.C. § 9-307(b)(1) (2001). Revised Article 9 does not define "principal residence."
The issue often is irrelevant. Frequently when the debtor is an individual the collateral will be
consumer goods. If the creditor's property interest in the consumer goods is a purchase money
security interest, the creditor's interest is automatically perfected under revised § 9-309(1). But
even so, the purchase money creditor may desire to file a financing statement to protect itself in
a priority dispute with an individual who buys the consumer goods from the debtor. See U.C.C.
§ 9-320(b) (2001). The location of the principal residence also becomes relevant if the creditor
cannot rely on automatic perfection because either the collateral is not consumer goods or the
security interest does not qualify as a purchase money security interest. If the individual debtor
has multiple residences, the secured party should file in each jurisdiction where the "principal
residence" may be located.
133. U.C.C. § 9-307(h) (2001). Cf THE NEW ARTICLE 9, at VII (Corinne Cooper ed., 2d ed.
1999) ("I was never very good at geography, but this will certainly be news to many who were.
(Those who have worked to free Congress of its beltway mentality will certainly lose heart to
learn of this.)"). Revised Article 9 does not define "United States." Nor is the term defined in
the general definitions section of U.C.C. Article 1. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (2001). But in the
context of revised § 9-307(h), the term presumably refers to any "debtor" that is an agency,
bureau, department, or other unit of federal government.
Revised § 9-307 also provides rules that apply when the debtor is a foreign debtor, an
agency or branch of a bank, a registered organization organized under federal law, or a foreign
air carrier. See U.C.C. §§ 9-307(c), (f), (i), (j) (2001).
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On March 1, Debtor borrowed $1,000,000 from Lender. Debtor granted
to Lender a security interest in Debtor's existing and future inventory,
wherever located. On March 1, Lender filed a financing statement with the
appropriate Texas clerk. On June 1, Debtor opened a store in New Orleans
(with furniture from Texas and Oklahoma) and relocated its chief executive
office to Louisiana. On November 1, the IRS filed a tax lien notice against
Debtor in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana.
In a dispute between Lender and the IRS concerning inventory and
accounts that Debtor held on November 1, whose interest is superior?
Under the I.R.C., Lender enjoys priority if it held a "security interest" in
the collateral when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 134 In order to hold a
"security interest" under the I.R.C., the interest must enjoy priority under
the U.C.C. against a lien creditor as of November 1.135
Under former Article 9, Lender's property interest in Texas inventory is
perfected because Lender filed -in Texas. 136 But Lender's property interest
in Oklahoma and Louisiana inventory is unperfected because Lender never
filed in those states.' 37 And because Lender never filed in Louisiana within
four months after Debtor relocated its chief executive office, Lender's
property interest in the accounts is unperfected.1 38 Lender's property
interest in the Texas inventory is superior to the competing claim of a lien
creditor that arose on November 1, but Lender's property interest in
Oklahoma inventory, Louisiana inventory, and all accounts is subordinate to
the interest of a lien creditor that arose on November 1.139 As to the Texas
inventory, Lender would enjoy priority over the IRS because Lender held a
"security interest" in the Texas inventory on November 1.140 But the IRS
would enjoy priority in the Oklahoma and Louisiana inventory and all
accounts because Lender did not have a "security interest" under the I.R.C.
on November 1.141
134. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).

135. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
136. U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001) (requiring Lender to file where the

collateral is located).
137. Id.
138. U.C.C. § 9-103(3)(b) (1995) (amended 2001) (requiring Lender to file where Debtor is

located); U.C.C, § 9-103(3)(d) (1995) (amended 2001) (indicating Debtor is located in the
jurisdiction of its chief executive office because it has more than one place of business); U.C.C.
§ 9-113(3)(e) (1995) (amended 2001) (stating Lender becomes unperfected if it fails to refile in
Louisiana within four months after Debtor relocates its chief executive office from Texas to
Louisiana).
139. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
140. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
141. Id.

HeinOnline -- 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 946 2002

34:0003]

AND THE WINNER IS... ?

947

Under revised Article 9, Lender's property interest in the Texas,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana inventory, and all accounts, is perfected because
Lender filed its financing statement where Debtor, a registered organization,
was located: i.e. Texas. 142 The location of Debtor's inventory is irrelevant.
The location of Debtor's chief executive office is irrelevant. Debtor's
relocation of its chief executive office and inventory is irrelevant. Because
Lender's property interest in all of the inventory and accounts is perfected
as of November 1, its property interest is superior to the competing claim of
a lien creditor that arises on that date. 143 Therefore, Lender enjoys priority
in Debtor's inventory and accounts held by Debtor on November 1 because
Lender holds a "security interest" under the I.R.C. as of that date.'44
b.

Intrastateoptions

A secured party that desires to perfect its security interest by filing a
financing statement must determine the state in which to file. Under former
Article 9, the secured party then had to determine whether to file centrally
(often with the office of the secretary of state), locally (i.e., at the county
level), or both, depending on which of three filing options the state had
enacted. 45 The first option required a local filing against certain realtyrelated collateral (e.g., fixtures, certain timber, minerals, and mineral-related
accounts) and a central filing against all other collateral. 46 The second
option required a local filing against the same realty-related collateral and
also consumer goods, crops, and farm products and farm-related collateral
147
(e.g., farming equipment); all other collateral required a central filing.

142. U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (2001) (stating Lender should file where "debtor is located");
U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (2001) (indicating a registered organization is located in the state of
organization).
143. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001).
144. I.R.C. § 6323(a).
145. Policy reasons for permitting states to choose among the three options are provided in
the official comments. See U.C.C. § 9-401 cmts. 1-4 (1995) (amended 2001); see also
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 125, at 138, observing that:
local/central regimes and dual filing requirements . . . had no commercial
utility and the original drafters knew it when they proposed three alternative
sets of filing rules. They also knew local clerks were powerful and a
proposed law that proposed to take away their revenues might not become
law. The original drafters bowed to political reality.
146. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1995) (amended 2001) (first alternative). States that adopted this
option in some form included: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska,
Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

SERIES ("Local Code Variations" Volume), Art. 9, Pt. 5, at 1-28 (2001).
147. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1995) (amended 2001) (second alternative). States that adopted
this option in some form included: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
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The third option mirrored the second option, subject to a significant
exception. The third option required a central and a local filing if the debtor
had a place of business in only one county within the state or
the debtor had
148
state.
the
in
resided
but
state
the
within
no place of business
The second and third options occasionally created problems for a secured
party. For example, a secured party might file its financing statement
against consumer goods at the county level, only to discover later that it was
unperfected because the collateral was equipment (requiring a central
filing). 149 And in a state that had adopted the third option, a secured party
that failed to file centrally and locally would be unperfected if the debtor
either did business only in one county within the state
or had no place of
150
state.
the
within
resided
but
state
the
within
business
These intrastate filing problems vanish under revised Article 9, which
dictates central filing for all 151
collateral, other than fixtures, as-extracted
cut.
be
to
timber
collateral, and
Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. See HAWKLAND, supranote 146.
148. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1995) (amended 2001) (third alternative). States that adopted
some form of this option included: Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See HAWKLAND, supra
note 143.
The following states adopted a non-uniform version of former § 9-401(1) that defied
categorization: California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
149. See, e.g., In re Pipes, 116 B.R. 154, 156 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (holding mechanic's
tools were equipment, not consumer goods, rendering secured party unperfected because it
failed to comply with the dual filing requirement applicable to business property); In re Ware,
59 B.R. 549, 552 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (concluding two pipe wrenches, socket set, hand
truck, two angle grinders, and a utility trailer were equipment, not consumer goods, leaving
secured party that failed to comply with dual filing requirement unperfected); cf In re Coed
Shop, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 472, 474 (N.D. Fla. 1977) ("If, for example, a creditor made only a
central filing which purported to perfect an interest in equipment and consumer goods, section
679.401(2) makes it clear that such a filing would perfect the equipment interest, which requires
central filing, but not the consumer goods interest, which requires local filing.").
150. See, e.g., In re Fox, 229 B.R. 160, 166-67 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998) (concluding
security interest in air conditioning equipment was unperfected because creditor failed to
comply with dual filing requirement applicable to debtor with place of business in only one
county); In re Geary's Bottled Liquors Co., 184 B.R. 408, 410-12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995)
(ruling security interest was unperfected because creditor failed to file continuation statement at
both the state and county level); Abramovitz v. Kew Realty Equities, Inc., 652 N.Y.S.2d 737,
738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (affirming trial court's decision that creditor's security interest in
partnership interest was unperfected because it failed to comply with dual filing requirement
applicable to debtor with place of business in only one county).
151. See U.C.C. § 9-501 (2001); Harry C. Sigman, The Filing System Under Revised
Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 61, 62-63 (1999) (noting that revised § 9-501 "simplifies the
rules at the intrastate level" and should "reduce the number of potential 'wrong filing office'
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The following example illustrates how the adoption of a uniform
intrastate filing scheme may aid a secured party involved in a priority
dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #6
On March 1, Dealer sold an electric keyboard to Consumer on credit,
retaining a security interest in the keyboard. Assuming that the keyboard
was a consumer good in the hands of Consumer, Dealer filed a financing
statement against the keyboard with the appropriate county clerk of State A
on March 5.152 Consumer is using the keyboard primarily to teach piano
lessons to neighborhood children (making the keyboard "equipment" under
Article 9). "' State A had adopted the second alternative of former § 9-401
(requiring a local filing for consumer goods, but a central filing for
equipment).
Also on March 1, Dealer sold a grand piano to Hotel on credit, retaining
a security interest in the piano. Hotel does business in only one county
within State B. Dealer filed a financing statement against the grand piano
with the secretary of state's office in State B on March 5 but made no local
filing. State B had adopted the third alternative of former § 9-401
(requiring a central and a local filing if the debtor has a place of business in
only one county within State B). On October 1, the IRS filed a tax lien
notice against Consumer in State A and Hotel in State B.
In a dispute between Dealer and the IRS concerning the keyboard and
the grand piano, whose interests are superior?
Under the I.R.C., Bank enjoys priority if it holds a "security interest" in
the musical instruments when the IRS filed its tax lien notice.154 Inorder
to hold a "security interest" under the I.R.C., Bank's interests must enjoy
priority under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor as of October 1.155
situations and.., litigation of this issue"); see also U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(6) (2001) (defining "asextracted collateral"); U.C.C. § 9-112(a)(41) (2001) (defining "fixtures").
152. If the keyboard was indeed a consumer good, then Dealer is not required to file a
financing statement to perfect its security interest. Dealer has a purchase money security
interest in the keyboard under former § 9-107 and revised § 9-103(a) & (b)(1). As a general
rule, a purchase money security interest in a consumer good is automatically perfected on
attachment under former § 9-302(l)(d) and revised § 9-309(1). Nevertheless, Dealer may wish
to file a financing statement to avoid losing a priority dispute with a person that buys the
keyboard from Consumer under former § 9-307(2) and revised § 9-320(b).
153. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(33) (2001) (defining "equipment"); U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (1995)
(amended 2001) (defining "equipment").
154. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
155. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
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Under former Article 9, Dealer's interest in the keyboard is unperfected
because it filed its financing statement at the local level, rather than
centrally.156 Dealer's interest in the piano is unperfected because it failed to
file its financing statement both centrally and locally. 57 Because Dealer is
unperfected, its property interests are subordinate to the interests of a lien
creditor.15 8 The IRS would enjoy priority under former Article 9 because
Dealer did not have a "security interest" under the I.R.C. as of October 1.159
Under revised Article 9, Dealer's interest in the keyboard is perfected
because financing statements filed against consumer goods and equipment
are filed in the same central office; 160 Dealer's interest in the grand piano is
perfected because a single central filing is sufficient; revised Article 9
eliminates the possibility that a creditor must file both centrally and locally
against a debtor. 161 Because Dealer's property interests are perfected before
October 1, its interests enjoy priority over the competing claims of a lien
creditor.' 62 Therefore, Dealer's property interest is superior under revised
Article 9 because it holds a "security interest" in both musical instruments
under the I.R.C. as of October 1.163
3.

Other filing revisions

a. Effect of lapse
The
A filed financing statement is effective for five years.' 64
effectiveness lapses unless the secured party files a continuation statement
within the last six months of the five-year period. 165 Upon lapse, the
156. See U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1995) (amended 2001) (second alternative).

See U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (1995) (amended 2001) (third alternative).
158. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
159. I.R.C. § 6323(a).
160. See U.C.C. § 9-501(a)(2) (2001).
161. See id.
162. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001).
163. I.R.C. § 6323(a).
164. U.C.C. § 9-515(a) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1995) (amended 2001). Query whether
revised Article 9 extends the effective period an extra day. Under former Article 9, the fiveyear period ran "from the date of filing." U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1995) (amended 2001). Under
revised Article 9, the five-year period runs "after the date of filing." U.C.C. § 9-515(a) (2001).
165. U.C.C. §§ 9-515(c), (d) (2001); U.C.C. §§ 9-403(2), (3) (1995) (amended 2001).
Cases decided under former Article 9 repeatedly held that continuation statements filed
prematurely were not effective, even if recorded by the clerk. See, e.g., In re Isringhausen, 151
B.R. 203, 206-07 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993) (holding ineffective a continuation statement filed four
days before commencement of the six-month refiling period); Banque Worms v. Davis Constr.
Co., 831 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (same-two days); NBD Bank, N.A. v.
157.
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creditor's property interest becomes unperfected, absent perfection by some
other means. 66 The prospective effect is that a secured party will be
unperfected against any secured party or lien creditor whose property
interest arises after the lapse. But what is the retroactive effect, if any, on
the secured party's priority against competing property interests that arose
before the lapse? Perhaps rephrased, if Secured Party #1 ("SP#1") enjoyed
priority over the competing property claim of Secured Party #2 ("SP#2")
and Lien Creditor ("LC") before SP#l's financing statement lapsed, will
SP#1 continue to enjoy the same priority after the lapse?
Under former Article 9, a property interest that became unperfected upon
lapse was "deemed to have been unperfected as against a person who
became a purchaser or lien creditor before lapse. '
Therefore, SP#1's68
interest would be subordinate to the competing property interests of SP#21
and LC after the lapse, even though SP#l enjoyed priority prior to the lapse.
But under revised Article 9, a security interest that becomes unperfected
upon lapse "is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser
of the collateral for value."' 69 Noticeably absent is any reference to lien
creditors. 170 Therefore, after lapse, SP#1's security interest becomes
171 but continues to enjoy priority over the
subordinate to SP#2's interest
72
property interest of LC.1
Timberjack, Inc., 527 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (same-five days). Revised Article
9 removes any contrary doubt. See U.C.C. § 9-510(c) & cmt. 4 (2001).
166. U.C.C. § 9-515(c) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1995) (amended 2001). For a
discussion of the methods of perfection, see supra note 37, and U.C.C. § 9-308(a) (2001).
167. U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1995) (amended 2001).
168. SP#2 is a "purchaser." See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1995) (amended 2001) (before being

revised as part of the Article 9 revision process, defining "purchase" as "taking by sale,
discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary
transaction creating an interest in property"); U.C.C. § 1-201(33) (1995) (amended 2001)
(defining "purchaser" as "a person who takes by purchase").
169. U.C.C. § 9-515(c) (2001).
170. Unlike its predecessor, revised § 9-515(c) refers to a "purchaser ... for value." An
Article 9 creditor with an enforceable property interest in the debtor's collateral should have no
difficulty with the "value" requirement. To have an enforceable security interest, the creditor
must give value under revised § 9-203(b)(1). The value need not be "new value," a term used
elsewhere in former and revised Article 9 and defined in revised Article 9. See U.C.C. §
9-312(e) (2001); U.C.C. §§ 9-330(a), (b), (e) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(57) (definition) & cmt.
21 (2001) (elaboration); U.C.C. § 9-108 (1995) (amended 2001); U.C.C. § 9-308 (1995)
(amended 2001).
171. When Article 9 was revised, the drafters also revised the definition of "purchase" by
inserting "security interest" after "lien," thus "mak[ing] explicit what formerly was implicit."
U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 32 (1999) (post-revision version). The implicit understanding derived
from the following language in the pre-revised definition: "'Purchase' includes taking by...
mortgage, pledge, lien... or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property."
See Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Six Consignments of Frozen Scallops, 4 F.3d 90, 95 (1st Cir.
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The following example illustrates that this change in law may aid a
secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #7
Dealer sold an MRI machine to Clinic on March 1, retaining an
enforceable property interest in the machine. That same day, Bank filed
with the appropriate clerk a financing statement against Debtor's assets.
Repayment terms required quarterly payments for seven years. Four years
later, the IRS filed a tax lien notice against Clinic. Litigation ensued
between Bank and the IRS after Bank's financing statement had lapsed.
In a dispute between Bank and the IRS concerning the MRI machine,
whose interest is superior?
Under the I.R.C., Dealer enjoys priority if it holds a "security interest" in
the collateral when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 173 In order to hold a
"security interest" under the I.R.C., Dealer's interest must enjoy priority
74
under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor.1
Under former Article 9, Dealer's interest in the machine became
unperfected when its financing statement lapsed. 175 The lapse has a
retroactive consequence: Dealer was never perfected against the I.R.C.,
which became a lien creditor before the lapse.176 Because Dealer was never
perfected, its property interest is subordinate to the property interest of a

1993) (noting that "an Article 9 secured party is a 'purchaser' of the debtor's interest in the
collateral" under U.C.C. § 1-201); In re Arlco, Inc., 239 B.R. 261, 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(observing that "the definition of purchaser [in U.C.C. § 1-201] is broad enough to include an
Article 9 secured party").
172. The official comments confirm this result. See U.C.C. § 9-515 cmt. 3 (2001).
Presumably this change was made because a lien creditor takes the debtor "as is" and does not

rely on the filing system. Therefore, a secured party that enjoys priority over a lien creditor
should not lose that priority merely because its financing statement has lapsed.
To a considerable extent, current law reflects the view that buyers and
secured parties are "reliance" parties who part with value in exchange for an
interest in specific property, whereas judicial lien creditors are "nonreliance"
parties who have bargained for the right to enforce a judgment against
whatever property the debtor may have on hand at the time.
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2059 (1994).

173. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
174. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
175. U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1995) (amended 2001).
176. See id.

HeinOnline -- 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 952 2002

34:0003]

AND THE WINNER IS... ?

953

lien creditor. 177 The IRS would enjoy priority under former
78 Article 9
because Dealer never had a "security interest" under the I.R.C.1
Under revised Article 9, Dealer's interest in the machine became
unperfected when its financing statement lapsed.179 But the lapse has no
adverse retroactive effect on the priority that Dealer enjoyed over the I.R.C.
prior to the lapse. 80° Dealer's property interest was perfected before the
filing date of the tax lien notice, so its interest enjo1ed priority over the
competing, but subsequent, claim of a lien creditor. 8 This priority is not
adversely affected by the subsequent lapse of Dealer's financing
statement. 82 Therefore, Dealer's property interest in the machine is
superior under revised Article 9 because it held a "security interest"
under
1 83
thereafter.
and
notice
lien
tax
the
of
date
filing
the
of
as
the I.R.C.
b.

PMSI graceperiod

Under former Article 9, a secured party's property interest was
subordinate to the competing property interest of a lien creditor if the
secured party's interest was unperfected when the lien creditor's property
interest arose.184 This rule was subject to one exception. A secured party
that perfected its interest after the lien creditor's interest arose enjoyed
85
priority over the lien creditor if (i) the secured party's interest attached1
before the lien creditor's interest arose; (ii) the secured party's interest was
a purchase money security interest ("PMSI"); 186 and (iii) the secured party
filed its financing statement no later87 than the tenth day after the debtor
received possession of the collateral.
Revised Article 9 adopts a similar, although not identical general rule for
resolving priority disputes between a secured party and a lien creditor. The
177. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
178. I.R.C. § 6323(a).
179. U.C.C. § 9-515(c) (2001).
180. Id. The IRS cannot argue that it was a "purchaser for value" because the IRS acquired
its property interest involuntarily, not voluntarily. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(29) (2001) (defining
"purchase" in terms of a voluntary transaction between the debtor and a purchaser).
181. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A) (2001).
182. U.C.C. § 9-515(c).
183. I.R.C. § 6323(a).
184. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001) (discussed supra at Part III).
185. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1), (2) (1995) (amended 2001) (discussing elements of

attachment).
186. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1995) (amended 2001) (defining "purchase money security
interest").
187. See U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1995) (amended 2001). The general priority rule of former §
9-301(l)(b) is expressly subject to the PMSI exception in former § 9-301(2). See U.C.C. §
9-301(1) (1995) (amended 200 1) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) .... ").
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secured party has priority if, before the lien creditor's property interest
arose, (i) the secured party was perfected or (ii) the secured party had filed
its financing statement and its security agreement was in place.' 8 Like its
predecessor statute, this general priority rule is subject to an exception that
applies if the lien creditor's property interest arose between attachment and
perfection of a PMSI. 18 9 But revised Article 9 extends the post-possession
filing period, requiring the secured party to file its financing statement no
later than the twentieth day after the debtor receives possession of the
collateral. 190
The following example illustrates that this filing extension may aid a
secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #8
On March 1, Seller sold a photocopier to Debtor on credit, retaining an
enforceable property interest in the item to secure repayment of the unpaid
purchase price. Seller delivered the photocopier to Debtor on March 10.
The IRS filed a tax lien notice against Debtor on March 15. On March 25,
Seller filed with the appropriate clerk a financing statement against the
photocopier.
In a dispute between Seller and the IRS, whose interest in the
photocopier is superior?
Under the I.R.C., Seller enjoys priority if it holds a "security interest" in
the photocopier when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 191 In order to hold a
"security interest" under the I.R.C., Seller's interest must enjoy priority
under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor as of March 15.192
Under the general priority rule of former Article 9, Seller's interest
would be subordinate to the property interest of a lien creditor because
Seller perfected its security interest on March 25, several days after the lien
creditor's property interest arose on March 15.193 Although Seller's
188. See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2001) (discussed supra at Part IIl).
189. See U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (2001); see also U.C.C. § 9-103(a) (2001), (defining "purchasemoney security interest"); U.C.C. § 9-203(a), (b) (2001) (discussing elements of attachment).
The general priority rule of revised § 9-317(a)(2) is expressly subject to the purchase-money
exception in revised § 9-317(e). See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2001) ("except as otherwise
provided in subsection (e)... ").
190. See U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (2001). Prior to enacting revised Article 9, many states had
made non-uniform amendments to former § 9-301(2) that extended the post-possession filing
deadline to twenty days. See HAWKLAND, supra note 146, at Art. 9, Pt. 3, at 1-6.
191. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
192. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
193. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
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94
property interest attached before March 15 and qualified as a PMSI,1
Seller cannot invoke the PMSI exception to the general priority rule because
Seller filed its financing statement on March 25-more than ten days after
Debtor took possession on March 10.195 Therefore, Seller's interest is
subordinate to the interest of a lien creditor.' 9 6 As a result, the IRS would
enjoy priority under former Article 9 because Seller did not have a "security
interest" under the I.R.C. as of March 15.197
Under the general priority rule of revised Article 9, a lien creditor's
property interest arising as of March 15 ranks ahead of the competing
15.198
property interest of Seller because Seller was not perfected on March
199
But Seller's property interest, a PMSI, attached before the lien creditor's
property interest arose. Therefore, Seller can invoke the PMSI exception to
the general priority rule because it filed its financing statement on March
25, within twenty days after Seller delivered the photocopier to Debtor. As
Seller timely filed its financing statement, its interest enjoys priority over
the competing claim of a lien creditor. 20 0 Therefore, Seller's property
interest is superior under revised Article 9 because it holds a "security
interest" under the I.R.C. as of March 15.201

c.

Instruments

Former Article 9 required a secured party to take possession of an
instrument in order to perfect a property interest in it.20 2 This requirement
created problems for a secured party in at least three situations. First, a
secured party, thinking an item of collateral was an instrument, would take
possession of the item but not file a financing statement. A court might
conclude that the item was an account or a general intangible, rather than an
instrument, leaving the secured party unperfected.2 °3 Second, a secured
194. Seller's security interest qualifies as a PMSI under former § 9-107(a).
195. See U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1995) (amended 2001).
196. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2001).
See U.C.C. §§ 9-103(a), (b)(l) (2001).
U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (2001).
I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).

202. U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1995) (amended 2001) (stating that a property interest in
instruments "can be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession," except in limited
cases of temporary perfection) (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., In re Newman, 993 F.2d 90, 92-95 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding annuity
contract in possession of creditor was general intangible, leaving non-filing creditor
unperfected); In re Holiday Intervals, Inc., 931 F.2d 500, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding land
sales contracts in creditor's possession were general intangibles, leaving non-filing creditor
unperfected).

HeinOnline -- 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 955 2002

956

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

party, believing that an item of collateral was an account or general
intangible, would file a financing statement but leave any writing in the
debtor's possession. A court might conclude that the item was an
instrument, leaving the non-possessor -creditor unperfected. 204 Third, a
secured party with a perfected interest in collateral such as inventory,
equipment, and accounts became unperfected in proceeds thereof in the
form of an instrument unless the secured party took possession of the
instrument. 205 But these problems disappear under revised Article 9, which
permits 6a secured party to perfect its security interest in an instrument by
20
filing.
The following example illustrates that this change in law may aid a
secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #9
Bank loaned $100,000 to Borrower on March 1, taking an enforceable
security interest in Borrower's assets, including several notes that remained
204. See, e.g., In re Kelly Group, Inc., 159 B.R. 472, 477-81 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993)
(observing that even if creditor had a security interest in the note, its financing statement would
not perfect the non-possessory interest because the note was an instrument); In re Coral
Petroleum, Inc., 50 B.R. 830, 837-41 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (holding promissory note was an

instrument, leaving non-possessor creditor that filed financing statement unperfected);
Berkowitz v. Chavo Int'l, Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-73 (N.Y. 1989) (concluding secured
party could not rely on financing statement covering "receivables" to perfect security interest in
promissory note held to be an instrument); Belke v. M & I First Nat'l Bank of Stevens Point,
525 N.W.2d 737, 738 n. 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) ("With exceptions not pertinent here, a security
interest in an instrument is perfected only by the secured party's taking possession, not by filing
at the secretary of state's office.").
205. See e.g., Bums, supra note 125, at 41-42; Peter F. Coogan, The New UCC Article 9,
86 HARv. L. REv. 477, 515-16 (1973); W. David East & Susan Byerly, Continuous Perfection
of Security Interests in Proceeds of Credit Sales of Inventory, 1986 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 115,
124-25; R. J. Robertson, Jr., Rights and Obligations of Buyers with Respect to Goods in Their
Possession After Rightful Rejection or Justifiable Revocation of Acceptance, 60 IND. L.J. 663,
717 (1985); see also U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1995) (providing for automatic perfection of a security
interest in identifiable proceeds that lapses after ten days unless one of four rules applies); cf
Citicorp (USA), Inc. v. Davidson Lumber, Co., 718 F.2d 1030, 1032-33 (11th Cir. 1983)
(concluding creditor did not have continuing perfected security interest in certificate of deposit
more than ten days after debtor received certificate as proceeds of other collateral). A handful
of states adopted a twenty-day grace period. See HAWKLAND, supra note 146, at Art. 9, Pt. 3,
pp. 33-9. Revised Article 9 adopts a twenty-day grace period. U.C.C. § 9-315(d) (2001).
206. U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (2001) ("A security interest in... instruments... may be perfected
by filing."). Although perfected by filing, a secured party may lose a priority dispute with a
purchaser of the instrument that gave value and took possession of the instrument in good faith
and without knowledge that the purchase violated the rights of the secured party. See U.C.C. §
9-330(d) (2001). The secured creditor could suffer the same priority loss in a dispute with a
possessor that qualifies as a holder in due course. See U.C.C. § 9-331(a) (2001).
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in Borrower's possession. That same day, Bank filed with the appropriate
clerk a financing statement against Borrower's assets (including
"instruments").
Bank also loaned $100,000 to Dealer on March 20, taking an enforceable
security interest in Dealer's existing and future inventory. That same day,
Bank filed with the appropriate clerk a financing statement against Dealer's
inventory. On June 1, Dealer sold an item of inventory to a customer that
executed a negotiable promissory note payable to Dealer (the "Note").
Dealer retained possession of the Note, an "instrument" under Article 9.
The IRS filed tax lien notices against Borrower and Dealer on October 1.
In a dispute between Bank and the IRS concerning (i) instruments
acquired by Debtor prior to October 1 and (ii) the Note held by Dealer,
whose interest is superior?
Under the I.R.C., Bank's property interests rank ahead of the federal tax
lien if Bank holds a "security interest" in the instruments and the Note when
the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 20 7 In order to hold a "security interest"
under the I.R.C., Bank's interests must enjoy priority under the U.C.C.
against a lien creditor as of October 1.208
Under former Article 9, Bank's interest in the instruments is unperfected
because Bank did not possess the instruments. 20 9 And although Bank's
interest in the Note was perfected upon Dealer's receipt of the Note, the
automatic perfection lapsed ten days later.
Because Bank is unperfected,
its interests in the instruments and the Note are subordinate to the interests
of a lien creditor.2 1 1 The IRS would enjoy priority under former Article 9
because Bank did not have a "securit interest" in the instruments and the
Note under the I.R.C. as of October 1. 2
Under revised Article 9, Bank's interest in the instruments is perfected
because Bank can perfect its interest by filing a financing statement against
the instruments. 2 13 Bank's interest in the Note remains perfected beyond
207.
208.
209.
210.

I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1995) (amended 2001).
U.C.C. § 9-306(3) (1995) (amended 2001). Subsection (3)(a) is inapplicable because a

security interest in the Note cannot be perfected by filing. See U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1995)
(amended 2001). Subsection (3)(b) is inapplicable because the Note is not "cash proceeds" as
defined in former § 9-306(1). Subsection (3)(c) is inapplicable for the same reason, and also
because the original collateral was inventory, rather than investment property. Subsection
(3)(d) is inapplicable because Bank failed to take any action within the ten-day period to extend
perfection (e.g., possess the Note).
211. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).

212. I.R.C. § 6323(a).
213. U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (2001).
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the automatic, but temporary, twenty-day period following Dealer's
possession because (i) a filed financing statement covered the original
collateral of inventory; (ii) a property interest in the Note can be perfected
by filing a financing statement in the same office as a filing against Dealer's
214
inventory; and (iii) the Note was not acquired with cash proceeds.
Because Bank's property interests in the instruments and the Note are
perfected before October 1, its interests enjoy priority over the competing
claims of a lien creditor.215 Therefore, Bank enjoys priority in the
instruments and the Note under revised Article 9 because Bank holds a
"security interest" under the I.R.C. as of October 1.216

B.

Changes to the Non-FilingRules

This section analyzes three non-filing changes that may have a resultreversing effect on the resolution of a priority dispute between the IRS and
the Article 9 creditor.
1.

Third-party possession

Former Article 9 permitted a secured party to perfect its property interest
in certain assets by possession. 217 If the collateral was held by a bailee,
then the secured party was "deemed to have possession from the time the
bailee receive[d] notification of the secured party's interest. ' ' 2 18 Former
Article 9 rejected the common law rule that the bailee must "attorn to the
secured party or acknowledge that" it holds the collateral for the benefit of
the secured party. 2 19 But under revised Article 9, a secured party is not
deemed to have possession of collateral held by a third party until the third
party has authenticated a record in which it acknowledges that it holds, or
will hold, collateral on behalf of the secured party. 2
The third-party
214. U.C.C. § 9-315(d)(1) (2001).
215. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2001).
216. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
217. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1995) (amended 2001) (limiting application to "goods, instruments
[other than certificated securities], money, negotiable documents or chattel paper").
218. Id.
219. Id. cmt. 2. Nevertheless, courts occasionally held that a party cannot be involuntarily
conscripted into serving as an agent for a secured creditor. See, e.g., In re Coral Petroleum,
Inc., 50 B.R. 830, 839 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985); In re Kontaratos, 10 B.R. 956, 967 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1981).
220. U.C.C. § 9-313(c) (2001). "Authenticate" and "record" are defined in revised §
9-102(a)(7) and revised § 9-102(a)(69), respectively. The rule covers collateral other than
certificated securities and goods covered by a document. U.C.C. § 9-313(c) (2001). An interest
in goods held by a bailee and subject to a nonnegotiable document can be perfected merely
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possessor is under no obligation to acknowledge that it holds, or will hold,
collateral for the secured party. 221 And absent any acknowledgment, the
secured party cannot222rely on third-party possession as a means of perfecting
its security interest.
The following example illustrates that this change in law may adversely
impact a secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.
Hypothetical #10
Bank loaned $100,000 to Debtor on March 1, taking an enforceable
security interest in Debtor's instruments and chattel paper, all held by a
third party ("Custodian"). On March 5, Bank mails a letter to Custodian,
informing Custodian that Bank has taken an enforceable security interest in
the instruments and chattel paper, which Custodian shall hold on behalf of
Bank. Custodian receives the letter but never expressly agrees to comply
with Bank's request. The IRS filed a tax lien notice against Debtor on
October 1.
In a dispute between Bank and the IRS concerning Debtor's instruments
and chattel paper held by Custodian on October 1, whose interest is
superior?
Under the I.R.C., Bank has priority if it holds a "security interest" in the
instruments and chattel paper when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 223 In
order to hold a "security interest" under the I.R.C., Bank's interest must
enjoy priority under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor as of October 1.224
Under former Article 9, Bank's interest in the instruments is perfected by
Custodian's possession. 225 Custodian must merely receive Bank's directive,
not consent to it.226 Because Bank is perfected, its security interest ranks
ahead of a competing claim of a lien creditor arising on October 1.227
upon the bailee's receipt of the creditor's notice of its interest; the bailee need not consent.

U.C.C. § 9-312(d)(2) (2001).
221. U.C.C. § 9-313(f) (2001).
222. A secured party that relies merely on the custodian's receipt of notice for its perfection
under former Article 9 is given one year after revised Article 9 becomes effective in which to
obtain the custodian's acknowledgment. During that one-year period, the secured party remains
perfected. But unless the secured party obtains the requisite acknowledgment, its security
interest will become unperfected after the one-year period ends. U.C.C. § 9-703(b) & cmt. 2

(2001).
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
See U.C.C. § 9-305 cmt. 2 (1995) (amended 2001).
Id.
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
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Therefore, Bank's interest in the instruments and chattel paper enjoys
priority over the IRS because Bank held a "security interest" under the
I.R.C. when the IRS filed its tax lien notice.22 8
Under revised Article 9, Bank's interest in the instruments and chattel
paper is unperfected because Custodian never. acknowledged, in an
authenticated record, that Custodian would hold the collateral for Bank's
benefit. 229 Because Bank's interest is unperfected on October 1, its interest
is subordinate to the competing claim of a lien creditor. 230 Therefore, the
lien held by the IRS in the instruments and chattel paper ranks ahead of
Bank's property interest because Bank did not hold231a "security interest"
under the I.R.C. when the IRS filed its tax lien notice.
2.

PMSIs

An issue that occasionally arose under former Article 9 was whether a
PMSI was converted into a generic security interest if (i) the security
agreement included an after-acquired property clause or a future advance
clause or (ii) the purchase-money debt was refinanced (or consolidated with
nonpurchase-money debt).232 Some courts held that the inclusion of an
228. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
229. U.C.C. § 9-313(c) (2001). Under revised Article 9, the prudent creditor will not rely
solely on third-party possession as its means of perfection. The creditor also will file a

financing statement against the instruments and chattel paper, a permitted means of perfecting
an interest in both types of collateral. U.C.C. § 9-312(a) (2001).
230. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2001).
231. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
232. A secured creditor prefers that its property interest qualifies as a PMSI because a
PMSI often enjoys special favor over a generic security interest. For example, the general
priority rule applicable to a dispute between a secured creditor and a lien creditor is subject to a
PMSI exception. U.C.C. §§ 9-317(a), (e) (2001); U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), (2) (1995) (amended
2001). Also, creditors with a PMSI in goods are entitled to super-priority over pre-existing
secured parties that otherwise enjoy priority under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule. U.C.C. §§ 9324(a), (b) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4) (1995) (amended 2001). And a secured party's
property interest is automatically perfected in most consumer goods if the property interest is a
PMSI. U.C.C. § 9-309(1) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1995) (amended 2001). Furthermore,
a consumer debtor in bankruptcy can avoid certain "nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest[s]" that impair an exemption. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B) (2000).
Scholarship on the contours of purchase money security interests abounds. See, e.g., Russell
A. Hakes, According Purchase Money Status Proper Priority, 72 OR. L. REv. 323 (1993);
Robert M. Lloyd, Refinancing PurchaseMoney Security Interests, 53 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1985);
Juliet M. Moringiello, A Tale of Two Codes: Examining § 522() of the Bankruptcy Code, §
9-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Proper Role of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 863 (2001); Paul M. Shupack, Defining PurchaseMoney Collateral,29 IDAHO
L. REv. 767 (1992-1993); Mark B. Wessman, PurchaseMoney Inventory Financing:The Case
for Limited Cross-Collateralization,51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (1990).
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after-acquired property clause or a future advance clause "transformed" a
PMSI into a generic security interest. 233 Other courts (often relying on the
"to the extent" language of former § 9-107) concluded that the inclusion of
such clauses did not destroy the purchase money nature. Instead, the
security interest enjoyed a "dual status," whereby the relationship between
an item and its purchase price remained a PMSI, and the relationship
between an item and other debt did not enjoy PMSI status. 3 Decisions
also reflect similar disagreement on the effect of debt refinancing and debt
consolidation on a property interest that began its life as a PMSI. Some
others
cases held that the debt restructure destroyed a PMSI,235 while 236
concluded that the property interest remained a PMSI to some extent.
Revised Article 9 resolves these issues in favor of the PMSI creditor.
In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a
purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such,
even if: (1) the purchase-money collateral also secures an
obligation that is not a purchase-money obligation; (2) collateral
that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchasemoney obligation; or (3) the purchase-money obligation has been
renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or restructured.237
The following example illustrates how the dual-status rule may aid a
secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.

233. See, e.g., Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d
1240, 1243 (1lth Cir. 1985); In re Delta Res., 162 BR. 562, 566-68 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993);

In re Jones, 5 BR. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 1980).
234. See, e.g., In re McAllister, 267 B.R. 614, 620-21 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001); In re
Weigert, 145 B.R. 621, 623-24 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1991); In re Griffin, 9 B.R. 880, 881 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1981).
235. See, e.g., Dominion Bank of Cumberlands, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408, 413 (4th
Cir. 1985); In re Mathews, 724 F.2d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Keeton, 161 B.R. 410, 412
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
236. See, e.g., In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405, 409 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Pristas, 742 F.2d
797, 801 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Short, 170 B.R. 128, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994).
237. U.C.C. § 9-103(f) (2001). See also U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7a (2001) ("[Tlhis Article
approves what some cases have called the 'dual-status'

rule . .

.

[and] rejects the

'transformation' rule adopted by some cases..."); Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 125, at 145
("In large part, Revised Article 9's rules represent a dedicated attempt to refute, reject, override,
eliminate, eradicate and otherwise kill the transformation rule in a commercial debtor context.").
Whether the "dual status" rule or the "transformation" rule applies in consumer-goods
transactions (defined at U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(24) (2001)) is left to the discretion of the court. See
U.C.C. § 9-103(h) & cmt. 8 (2001).
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Hypothetical #11
On March 1, Seller and Debtor execute a master purchase agreement,
under which the parties contemplate that Debtor will buy one or more
pieces of office equipment from Seller over time. The agreement creates a
security interest in any item sold and includes a future advance clause and
an after-acquired property clause. On April 1, Seller sold and delivered a
photocopier to Debtor. On April 8, Seller sold and delivered a fax machine
to Debtor. On April 20, Seller filed with the appropriate clerk a financing
statement against the photocopier and the fax machine. The IRS filed a tax
lien notice against Debtor on April 15.
In a dispute between Seller and the IRS concerning the photocopier and
the fax machine, whose interest ranks ahead of the other?
Under the I.R.C., Seller's property interest is superior if it holds a
"security interest" in the two items of office equipment when the IRS filed
its tax lien notice.2 38 In order to hold a "security interest" under the I.R.C.,
Seller's interest must enjoy priority under the U.C.C. against a lien creditor
as of April 15.239
Under the general priority rule of former Article 9, Seller's interest is
subordinate to the property interest of a lien creditor because Seller
perfected its property interest five days after the lien creditor's property
interest arose on April 15.140 Moreover, in a jurisdiction that has adopted
the transformation rule, Seller cannot invoke the PMSI exception of former
§ 9-301(2) because the inclusion of an after-acquired property clause and a
future advance clause in the agreement prevents Seller from claiming a
PMSI in the two items.24 Without a PMSI, Seller's interest in the two
items is subordinate to the interest of a lien creditor.2 4 As a result, the IRS
would enjoy priority under former Article 9 because Seller did not have a
"security interest" under the I.R.C. as of April 15.243
Under the general priority rule of revised Article 9, a lien creditor's
property interest arising as of April 15 ranks ahead of the competing
244
property interest of Seller because Seller was not perfected on April 15.
But Seller can invoke the PMSI exception of revised § 9-317(e). Seller's
238. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
239. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
240. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
241. Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1243
(11th Cir. 1985) ("A PMSI requires a one-to-one relationship between the debt and the
collateral.").
242. See U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1995) (amended 2001).
243. See I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).

244. See U.C.C.

§ 9-317(a)(2) (2001).
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property interest in the two items attached under revised § 9-203 no later
than the delivery dates, each before the lien creditor's property interest
arose. And Seller filed its financing statement on April 20, within twenty
days after Debtor took possession of the first item on April 1. Because
revised Article 9 has adopted the dual-status rule, Seller can claim that its
interest in each item is a PMSI to the extent of its purchase price.2 45 To that
extent, Seller's interest enjoys priority over the competing claim of a lien
creditor.24 6 Therefore, and (but limited) to the same extent, Seller enjoys
priority under revised Article 9 because it holds a "security interest" under
the I.R.C. as of April 15.247
3.

Deposit accounts

Transfers of interests in deposit accounts as original collateral were
excluded from the scope of former Article 9.248 This exclusion did not
prevent parties from agreeing that a debtor's deposit accounts would secure
repayment of an obligation. But it did require the parties to comply with
law other than Article 9, usually a state's common law, and this posed
problems. "The common law is nonuniform, often difficult to discover and
comprehend, and frequently costly to implement. As a consequence,

245. To illustrate the extent of Seller's PMSI in each item, assume that the photocopier cost
$1,000, the fax machine cost $500, and Debtor has not made any payments. Because the
agreement includes cross-collateralization clauses, the photocopier and the fax machine each
secure repayment of $1,500. The security interest in the photocopier enjoys PMSI status in the
amount of its unpaid purchase price ($1,000) and non-PMSI status in the amount of the unpaid
purchase price of the fax machine ($500). The security interest in the fax machine enjoys PMSI
status in the amount of its unpaid purchase price ($500) and non-PMSI status in the amount of
the unpaid purchase price of the photocopier ($1,000).
Debtor may have paid off some of the debt by the time the priority dispute is resolved.
Assume that Debtor has paid $700 to Seller and the agreement requires Seller to apply payments
to obligations in the order incurred. (U.C.C. § 9-103(e) (2001) governs payment application.)
Now each item secures total debt of $800, and the security interest in the photocopier enjoys
PMSI status only to the extent of its unpaid purchase price ($300).
246. See U.C.C. § 9-317(e) (2001).
247. See I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
248. U.C.C. § 9-104(o (1995) (amended 2001). Former Article 9 defined a "deposit
account" as "a demand, time, savings, passbook or like account maintained with a bank, savings
and loan association, credit union or like organization, other than an account evidenced by a
certificate of deposit." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(e) (1995) (amended 2001). A few states (including
California and Illinois) enacted non-uniform amendments that brought deposit accounts within
the scope of former Article 9. See Warner, supra note 69, at 45 n.238.
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debtors who wished to use deposit accounts as
collateral sometimes were
249
precluded from doing so as a practical matter."
Familiarity, and compliance, with the common law has become
irrelevant, as revised Article 9 extends the scope of its coverage to include
transfers of interests in deposit accounts (except in consumer
transactions).250
The following example illustrates how this scope expansion may aid a
secured party involved in a priority dispute with the IRS.

249. U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 16 (2001). Numerous scholars have echoed similar sentiments.
See, e.g., Jason M. Ban, Deposit Accounts: An Article 9 Security Interest, 17 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 493, 494 (1998).
Because they are not governed by the U.C.C., secured transactions
collateralized by deposit accounts are currently governed by "a hodgepodge
of common law and non-uniform amendments," while, "the legal uncertainty
surrounding these arrangements probably reduces the availability of credit
because of the inability to give the lenders the degree of assurance that a
secured lender typically seeks."
Id. at 494 (footnotes omitted); Vincent Paul Cardi, PreservingExisting Security Interests Under
Revised Article 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code: A Concise Summary of the TransitionRules
and Some Recommendationsfor Secured Parties, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 289, 294 (2001) (noting
the "existing, often unclear, common-law rights" of a secured party in a deposit account); Alvin
C. Harrell, Revised UCC Article 9: Introduction to the Symposium, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 140, 144 (2000) (noting, under former Article 9, that a creditor's claims against deposit
accounts "are governed by non-UCC law, often involving an amorphous relationship between
vague common law principles and a diverse array of other laws"); Mark J. Volow & C. Mark
Laskay, Revised Article 9: What Banks Need to Know, 118 BANKING L.J. 99, 100 (2001)
(observing that common law principles "can lead to ambiguity as to the validity and priority of
the secured party's interest in the collateral and thereby diminish its value in the secured lending
market"); Steven 0. Weise, U.C.C. Article 9: PersonalProperty Secured Transactions, 56 Bus.
LAW. 1835, 1836 (2001) (referring to "antiquated common law concepts" underlying a court's
conclusion that a secured party did not have a perfected property interest in the debtor's deposit
account). For a general discussion of deposit accounts as collateral under the common law, see
Dwight L. Greene, Deposit Accounts as Bank Loan CollateralBeyond Setoff to Perfection - the
Common Law is Alive and Well, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 259 (1989-1990), and Gerald T.
McLaughlin, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts: Unresolved Problems and Unanswered
Questions Under Existing Law, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 45 (1988).
250. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(13) (2001); U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(26) (2001) (defining "consumer
transaction"). Revised Article 9 defines a "deposit account" as "a demand, time, savings,
passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank. The term does not include investment
property or accounts evidenced by an instrument." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(29) (2001). For a general
discussion of deposit accounts as collateral under revised Article 9, see Bruce A. Markell, From
Property to Contractand Back: An Examination of DepositAccounts and Revised Article 9, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963 (1999).
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Hypothetical #12
Bank loaned $100,000 to Debtor, a corporate entity, on March 1. Bank
and Debtor agreed, in writing, that Debtor's bank accounts maintained with
Bank would serve as collateral. The agreement required Debtor to maintain
a minimum balance in the accounts but otherwise permitted Debtor to
deposit and withdraw funds during the term of the loan. The IRS filed a tax
lien notice against Debtor on October 1.
In a dispute between Bank and the IRS concerning Debtor's deposit
accounts maintained with Bank, whose interest is superior?
Under the I.R.C., Bank enjoys priority if it holds a "security interest" in
the deposit accounts when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. 251 In order to
hold a "security interest" under the I.R.C., Bank's interest must have
priority over a lien creditor's interest arising as of October 1.252
Under the common law, Bank cannot claim a property interest in the
deposit accounts because Bank does not have exclusive and unfettered
control of the deposit accounts. 253 The IRS would enjoy priority under the
common law because Bank did not have a "security interest" in the deposit
accounts as of October 1.254
After revised Article 9 becomes effective, the common law no longer
applies. Because Debtor maintains its deposit accounts with Bank, Bank
has "control" of the deposit accounts.2 5 5 Under revised Article 9, Bank's
control results in perfection of its property interest. 256 Unlike the common
251. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
252. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(A) (2000).
253. See e.g., Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 540 F.2d 548, 563 (2d Cir. 1976)
(holding bank's failure to prove exclusive control over overseas deposit account prevented bank
from claiming security interest); Ellefson v. Centech Corp., 606 N.W.2d 324, 334 (Iowa 2000)
(concluding creditor did not have interest in two bank accounts because creditor did not have
"absolute, unequivocal, and exclusive possession and control of the accounts"); All Am. Auto
Salvage v. Camp's Auto Wreckers, 679 A.2d 627, 631 (N.J. 1996) ("Although First Fidelity
intended to create security interests through the deposit agreements, it lacked exclusive
possession and control over the accounts. Consequently, it did not hold security interests in the
accounts.").
254. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
255. U.C.C. § 9-104(a)(1) (2001). If the secured party is not the bank that maintains the
deposit account, then the secured party can achieve "control" in one of two ways: (1) "the
debtor, secured party, and bank" execute an agreement in which the bank agrees to "comply
with instructions" from the secured party to liquidate the account without the debtor's consent;
or (2) "the secured party becomes the bank's customer" on the account. See U.C.C. §
9-104(a)(2)-(3) (2001). For an example of a three-party control agreement, see Markell, supra
note 250, app., at 1029.
256. U.C.C. § 9-314(a) (2001) (indicating a security interest in a deposit account may be
perfected by control under revised § 9-104); U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1) (2001) (stating "a security
interest in a deposit account [as original collateral] may be perfected only by control").
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law, revised Article 9 does not require Bank to have absolute and exclusive
control. Bank has control sufficient to perfect its property interest "even if
[Debtor] retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the deposit
account[s]. ' 25 7 As Bank's property interest in Debtor's accounts is
perfected before October 1, its interest enjoys priority over the competing
claim of a lien creditor.258 Therefore, Bank enjoys priority in Debtor's
deposit accounts259because Bank holds a "security interest" under the I.R.C.
as of October 1.
V.

CONCLUSION

Many persons are surprised to learn that the IRS does not always win
every priority dispute. Perhaps greater shock comes from the fact that
Congress seems in no hurry to rewrite the federal tax code in a manner that
assures victory for the public purse. Instead, the federal tax laws permit the
Article 9 creditor to enjoy priority in the limited assets of a delinquent
taxpayer if its property interest is protected under local law against a
judgment lien arising as of the moment when the IRS files its tax lien
notice. Under both former and revised Article 9, this protection is afforded
to a secured party that has perfected its property interest no later than when
the lien creditor's interest arises in the taxpayer's assets. Although the basic
priority rule remains the same under former and revised Article 9, the
perfection rules have changed. In a priority dispute between the secured
party and the IRS, several of these changes may reverse the result reached
under former Article 9. The overwhelming number of the potential
reversals favors the secured party, illustrating that revised Article 9 offers
an edge over its predecessor. In a priority dispute with the IRS, any edge is
welcome.

257. U.C.C. § 9-104(b) (2001). See also David Frisch, Revised Article 9: A Primerfor the
General Practitioner,35 U. RICH. L. REv. 813, 827 (2001) ("The debtor need not give up his
right to direct disposition of the funds in the account; as long as the secured party is able to do
so, the secured party will have control."); Warner, supra note 69, at 47 ("Although the control
agreement could be drafted to restrict the debtor's use of the account, the debtor may retain full
rights... to use the account without destroying the secured party's control."); Welle, supra note
125, at 565 ("A secured party has control over a deposit account even if the debtor retains the
right to access the account or direct disposition of the funds.").

258. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2001).
259. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2000).
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